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The First Amendment and the Cable
Television Operator: An Unprotective
Shield Against Public Access
Requirements
By

MICHAEL

I.

MEYERSON*

Cable television is in the forefront of America's "communications revolution."! In the words of Justice Brennan, "The potential of [t] he new industry to augment communication
services now available is ... phenomenal."2 One of the most
significant services which cable technology can offer is the institution of public access channels. Such channels, available
on a nondiscriminatory basis for the use of the general public,
present the possibility of a diverse, pluralistic medium, one
through which members of a community can communicate effectively with one another.
The Federal Communications Commission promulgated
rules mandating that all but the smallest cable companies set
aside channels for public access. 3 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit struck down this requirement on the ground
that the Commission lacked the statutory authority to issue
the rules. 4 The court added that, had it been necessary to decide the constitutionality of the rules, they would have been
found violative of both the First Amendment5 guarantee of free
speech and the Fifth Amendment6 due process clause. 7 The
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the
• J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1979; Member, New York Bar; Legal Writing
instructor, Brooklyn Law School. The views of the author are his own and should not
be attributed to any other person or agency.
1. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 481 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1974).
2. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 651 (1972) (plurality opinion) (hereinafter referred to as Midwest I).
3. Report and Order, Docket 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976).
4. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), alf'd, 440 U.S. 689
(1979) (hereinafter referred to as Midwest II).
5. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... " U.S.
CONST. amend. 1.
6. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V.
7. Midwest II, 571 F.2d at 1056.
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rules exceeded the Commission's authority, but did not address the issue of their constitutionality, except to say that the
question was "not frivolous."8
The unresolved issue of the constitutionality of governmentmandated access to cable television systems must still be
faced. Even if the federal government does not reimpose the
rules,9 several states have already enacted their own access requirements. 10 This article will examine whether such requirements by a state violate the First Amendment rights of the
cable television operator. l l
Many commentators have assumed that the primary focus of
such an analysis must be a determination of whether cable
television is "like" a newspaper or "like" a television broadcaster, followed by a routine application of the appropriate
constitutional standard. 12 This approach is both simplistic and
needlessly subjective. The proper inquiry must be whether a
cable access rule, "abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect."13 Accordingly, the effect of an access requirement on the various interests served by the First
Amendment will be examined. It will be demonstrated that
those interests are furthered substantially by such a requirement, and in a manner which is not inconsistent with the
Constitution. 14
8. Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 709 n.l9.
9. The Supreme Court stated that the question of ''whether less intrusive access
regulation might fall within the Commission's jurisdiction ... is not presently before
this Court." Id. at 705 n.14.
10. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-333(c) (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.05(b)
(West Supp. 1981). California permits cable companies to be free from rate regulation
only if certain criteria are met, one of which is provision of public access channels.
CAL. GoV'T CODE § 53066.1 (West Supp. 1981). For an excellent discussion of current
state cable access requirements, see Hamson, Access and Pay Cable Rates: Off-Limits
to Regulators After Midwest Video II?, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 591, 619-30 (1981).
11. The question of whether access requirements violate the due process clause is
beyond the scope of this article.
12. See, e.g., B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS PuBLIC ACCESS, 199-216 (1976);
Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable Tv.' Fostering Debate in a Cohesive Audience, 61
VA. L. REV. 515, 525-32 (1975); Ross, The First Amendment: A New Interpretation
Needed/or Cable, CABLEVISION, May 18, 1981, at 120; Note, Cable Television and Con·
tent Regulation: The FCC, the First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51
N.Y.U. L. REV. 133, 146-47 (1976); Note, Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC: The First Amend·
ment Implications o/Cable Television Access, 54 IND. L.J. 109, 120 (1978). See also Na·
tional Cable Television Association, Cable Television, Government Regulation, and the
First Amendment, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 577.
13. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). See text ac·
companying notes 215-17, infra.
14. See text accompanying notes 217-76, infra.
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To determine the appropriate constitutional test to be utilized, this article will also explore the different possible classifications of the access requirement: as local regulation of a
locality's public streets; as regulation of a scarce communications medium; as a time, place, or manner restriction; as an attempt to encourage diversity in mass communications, and as
an incidental restriction on the rights of the cable television
operator. Cable television access requirements will be shown
to fulfill the standards for each of these classifications, whether
a "reasonableness" test or that of a narrowly drawn measure to
further important governmental interests unrelated to the
supression of speech is applied. 15

I
An Introduction to Cable Television
Cable television 16 is basically a system for carrying television and other broadcast signals into the home by wire rather
than through the airP The wire is usually a coaxial cable,I8
capable of carrying many different signals without interference. 19 There are several different sources for the signals.
Television stations, both local and distant, send out signals
that can be captured by antennae. 20 These signals are carried
to the "headend," where they are amplified and sent along the
cable distribution system.
Once cable systems are established, cable television operators can also transmit their own programs directly over the
15. See text accompanying notes 277-445, infra.
16. The original tenn "community antenna television" or "CATV" described systems that received and redistributed television broadcast signals. Because of the
broader range of services now offered, see text accompanying notes 79-98, infra, the
tenn "cable television" is now used, Midwest II, 440 U.S. at '697 n.6.
17. For a brief history of the development of cable television, see generally M.
HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 1-20 (1979).
18. A coaxial cable is a "copper or copper coated aluminum wire surrounded by an
insulating layer of air or plastic foam ... The insulating layer is covered with tubular
shielding composed of tiny strands of braided copper wire, or a seamless aluminum
sheath, and protective outer jacket." NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON CABLE TELEVISION, CABLE COMMUNICATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 265 (1981). Some cable companies
use glass fiber instead of coaxial cables to carry the signals. One fiber, the width of a
human hair, can replace a 3/4 inch cable and carry more channels for a longer distance.
See Brown, TV:' Use oj Fiber Transmission Begins, N.Y. Times, July 9,1976, at AI, col.
3.
19. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-62 (1968); see
also W. BAER, CABLE TELEVISION: A HANDBOOK FOR DEClSIONMAKING 3-4 (1973).
20. See text accompanying notes 71-72, infra.
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cables and onto unused channels. 21 In the 1970's, accessible
communications satellites made it possible for a single communications source to transmit programs simultaneously to
cable television systems all over the country.22 This marked
the birth of so-called "pay television."
With the advances in technology and the concomitant increase in the services provided by cable television, there has
been an explosive growth in the number of cable television
systems and subscribers.23 In 1952, there were 70 cable systems serving 70,000 subscribers.24 By 1975 there were over 3,400
systems serving 9.8 million subscribers.25 In 1981 there were
over 4,400 systems serving 17.2 million subscribers, more than
one-fifth of all television households. 26 Current estimates are
that by 1990 more than 60% of all United States television
households, over 57 million households, will be cable television
subscribers.27
A. Economics of Cable Television

The construction of a modern cable television system, particularly in urban areas, is an extremely expensive undertaking.
The most costly aspect is the distribution system: the cables
which carry the signals from the headend antennae to the individual subscribers. Cost for the distribution systems vary
widely.28 In suburbs where cables can be strung overground
on existing utility and telephone poles, the cost can range from
$4,500 to $14,000 a mile.29 If the cables must be laid under21. See text accompanying notes 79-82, infra.
22. See United States v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 507 F. Supp. 412, 415
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 7 Media. L. Rptr.. 1342 (2d Cir. 1981) (not formal opinion of court
of appeals). See also text accompanying notes 83-92, infra.
23. In Midwest I, Chief Justice Burger referred to the "almost explosive development of CATV." 406 U.S. at 676 (concurring opinion). See also Southwestern Cable
Co., 392 U.S. at 162-63.
24. Taylor, In Scramble to Bring Cable TV to Your Area, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT, Oct. 6, 1980, at 48.
25. Home Box Office Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
26. BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981).
27. Cable Stats, CABLEVlSION, Jan. 4,1982, at 55.
28. ''This variation results not from the cost of cable and electronics, but because
of the almost infinite construction possibilities." Cable Television Information Center,
Cable Economics 11 (1972) (hereinafter Cable Economics).
29. See, e.g., W. BAER, supra note 19, at 47; Taylor, supra note 24, at 48; BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981). Rates for pole attachment are now set by the Federal Communications Commission pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1981).
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ground, the cost is far higher.30 While in sparsely populated
areas it might cost less than $10,000 a mile to put down underground cable,31 in the heavily populated urban areas the cost
can be $25,000 to $50,000 or more. 32 In parts of San Francisco,
for example, it costs $100,000 a mile to put in the cables while
avoiding the city's sewer system. 33
There are other major elements of a cable television company's initial capital investment in addition to the distribution
system. The headend equipment, including construction of
tower, antenna, and processing equipment, can cost well over
$100,000.34 There are also costs directly related to the number
of subscribers. These include drop lines into each home and
subscriber terminals.35
The considerable start-up costs have led to a change in the
structure of the cable television industry. Where once the typical cable operators were small "mom-and-pop" businesses,
most cable systems today are not individually owned. 36 Additionally, many smaller systems are being acquired by larger
companies.37 As of December, 1980, 50 of the largest multiple
systems operators (M.S.O.'s) owned 75% of the nation's cable
television. systems. 38
Another facet of the economics of cable television is that
most of the cable operator's investment is for equipment and
facilities shared by the subscribers. The marginal cost attributable to any additional subscriber is relatively small. 39 Therefore, costs-per-subscriber decrease as the number of
30. Costs for· placing underground cables can increase dramatically, depending on
soil and ground conditions, number of cables, whether existing conduits may be used
or whether they must be relocated. See Cable Economics, supra note 28, at 11.
31. W. BAER, supra note 19, at 47; BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981).
32. Taylor, supra note 24, at 48.
33. Cable TV.' The Race to Plug In, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 8, 1980, at 67.
34. Cable Economics, supra note 28, at 11.
35. See Inquiry into the Economic Relationship between Television Broadcasting
and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 666 (1979) (hereinafter Economic Inquiry).
36. "This isn't a 'mom and pop' industry that needs protection anymore. Mom and
pop are now playing golf in Palm Springs with the money they made selling their cable
system to a conglomerate." Shenon, Cable TV:S Benefactor Comes under Fire, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 9,1981,3, at 6, col. 1 (quoting David Ladd, U.S. Register of Copyrights). See
also Gits, Media Concentration: Conglomerates Take Cable's Bait, CABLEVISION, Dec.
15,1980, at 128-50; How Cable Works, N.Y. Times, July 5,1981, at 25, col. 3.
37. See Cable TV: The Race to Plug In, supra note 33, at 68.
38. Id.
39. Economic Inquiry, supra note 35, at 667; W. BAER, supra note 19, at 52.
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subscribers increases. 40
It is the number of subscribers that determines the financial
success or failure of a cable system.41 The degree of penetration-the percentage of homes potentially serviced by the
cable system that sign up for the service-necessary for a system's success will vary according to the amount of necessary
capital investment and the number of homes per square mile.
Estimates of the penetration necessary for a system to break
even range from 20% to 40%.42
A 1979 study by the Federal Communications Commission43
concluded that in areas where there is adequate over-the-air
reception of television broadcast signals,44 the ultimate penetration rate for cable television systems is significantly limited.45 The maximum penetration rates in the urban areas of
the 100 largest television markets 46 were predicted to reach between 20% and 40%.47 The F.C.C. concluded that with a ceiling
of 40% penetration in the largest cities, "the total number of
cable subscribers in all markets will not be greater than about
forty-eight percent of the total number of television, households within the foreseeable future ...."48
Both the economics of scale and the limited potential for
penetration have created a situation where most cable operators face no direct competition from other cable companies
within their own franchised area. In over 99.9% of the localities
wU'ed for cable television, there is only one cable company.49
B. The Question of Natural Monopoly

Much of the early discussion of the proper role of government regulation of the cable television industry assumed that
the distribution function of a cable television system was a
"natural monopoly" in the area which it served.50 Some courts
40. See W. BAER, supra note 19, at 50.
41. Cable Economics, supra note 28, at 11.
42. See W. BAER, supra note 19, at 41-42; Kennedy, Small Towns Join Forces to Get
Cable T. V., N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1969, at Bl, col. 2.
43. Economic Inquiry, supra note 35; 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979).
44. Adequate over-the-air reception means both availability of more than a few
broadcast signals and strong quality reception. Id. at 669.
45. Id. at 662.
46. 47 C.F.R. § 76.51 (1980),
47. Economic Inquiry, supra note 35, at 669.
48. Id. at 672.
49. See text accompanying note 59, irifra.
50. See, e.g., TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affd without
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have held that, to the contrary, because it may be physically
possible for more than one cable television company to serve a
community, cable television, unlike either broadcast television
stations or utilities providing electrical service, is not a natural
monopoly.51
Professor Richard Posner has defined "natural monopoly" as
the condition which occurs when it is less expensive for the
first firm in an area to supply service or products to additional
customers than for a new entrant in the area, "not because the
firm is more efficient in the sense that its cost curve lies below
those of other firms ... but because one firm can supply the
entire output demanded at a lower cost than could more than
one firm."52 According to Professor Posner, this condition
arises when fixed costs, those not affected by changes in the
amount of goods or services produced, are very large in relation to the amount of consumer demand: "If the fixed costs can
be spread over the entire output of the market, a firm supplying that output may have a lower average cost of production
than, say, two firms, each of which incurs the same fixed costs
but spreads them over only one half the output."53
Cable television appears to meet this definition of a natural
monopoly.54 The largest portion of a cable company's exopinion, 396 U.S. 556 (1970); The Cabinet Committee on Cable Television, CABLE 20
(1974) (hereinafter Cabinet Committee); THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE 5 (1971) (hereinafter SLOAN COMMISSION). Cj Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("lilt is the purpose of the First Amendment to
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee").
51. See, e.g., Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D.
Ohio 1968), aJf'd sub nom. Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548
(6th Cir. 1970); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035,
1039-40 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 50 U.S.L. W. 4144 (1982) (hereinafter Boulder I).
52. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 139-49 (1978).
53. Id. at 140.
54.There are no current adequate substitutes for cable television. In United
States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co." 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956), the Supreme Court
said that to determine the components of a single product market, one must examine,
"products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are
produced-price, use and qualities considered." Over-the-air broadcast television is
not interchangeable with cable; not only are the number of broadcast channels often
either limited in number or poorly received by a community, see text accompanying
notes 71-72, irifra, but the current channel capacity of cable, see text accompanying
notes 76-78, irifra, offers far more variety than over-the-air broadcasting. See Posner,
Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 642-43 (1969). Movies and
live theater are much more expensive for a family to view than cable and they require
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penses, such as the headend and distribution system, are fixed
costS. 55 These costs are both extremely high and independent
of the number of subscribers to the cable system.56 Additionally, having competing cable companies is economically inefficient since each company would have to duplicate the cables
and equipment of the others.57
Cable television has indeed developed as a monopoly industry throughout the country.58 Of the 4,200 cable television systems currently operating, there are an estimated eight
instances of so-called "overbuilds"-two cable companies competing for the same subscribers.59 Historically, overbuilds
have been eliminated by one company buying out the other,60
though occasionally other agreements are reached, such as dividing the locality among the competing cable companies with
the understanding that no company will go into another's "priority service area" unless that company has clearly failed to
meet its commitments in its priority area.61
the family to leave its home. The new technologies, such as direct broadcast satellites,
multipoint distribution service, and subscription television, while potentially competitive with cable television, see Botein, Jurisdictional and Antitrust Considerations in
the Regulation of the New Technologies, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 863, 880-82 (1980), are
currently significantly more expensive, less accessible, and able only to offer considerably less diversified programming than cable. See MAJORITY STAFF OF HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION (1981), excerpted in Emerging Competition,
CABLEVISION, Dec. 7, 1981, at 285. See also National League of Cities, supra note 12, at
22.
55. See text accompanying notes 28-34, infra.
56. See text accompanying notes 38-40, infra; see also Economic Inquiry, supra
note 35, at 666-67; Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 10.
57. R. POSNER, CABLE TELEVISION: THE PROBLEM OF LoCAL MONOPOLY 1 (1970).
58. Although many states require that cable franchises be "non-exclusive," e.g.,
HAw. REV. STAT. § 440G-8(d) (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.05(6) (West Supp.
1981), that non-exclusivity is not used to create competition but only to permit a community to award a second franchise if the first company does not perform properly.
E.g., Dawson, How Safe Is Cable's Natural Monopoly?, CABLEVISION, June 1, 1981, at
343. Cable companies also generally are reluctant to enter a community which has
already been wired: "[i)n reality, if one operator has 'built' a city, another cable operator isn't going to build another system." Courts Ponder Status of Cable TV to Rule
Legality of Regulation, Wall St. J., Dec. 29,1980, at ll, col. 1 (quoting James Ewalt, an
attorney with the National Cable Television Association).
59. Dawson, supra note 58, at 340.
60. Id. at 333-34.
6l. Id. at 334. This is how the "problem" of overbuilds was resolved in Allentown,
Pennsylvania. The solution avoid changing the original non-exclusive franchise permits into an exclusive franchise agreement, yet created a situation where, "as long as
performance is up to standards, nobody has to worry about someone else encroaching
on his turf." Id. at 339.
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There does appear to be merit, however, in the argument
that some competition is possible among cable television systems. While at least one court has mistakenly assumed that
the large number of channels which can be carried through a
cable eliminates the danger of monopoly control of all those
channels,62 other courts have argued, more to the point, that
current technology permits more than one distribution system
to exist in a given area. 63 In Community Communications Co.
v. City of Boulder, the trial judge found that there could be
more than one cable company using the same poles. 64 This capability, according to the court, would permit between two and
four cable companies to compete for the same subscribers. 65
The city of Phoenix, Arizona has actually authorized direct
competition among cable companies. 66 After complaints surfaced that the first franchised company was not wiring the city
quickly enough, other companies requested the opportunity to
operate in the city. The city council awarded franchises to
three other companies. Phoenix was divided into sections and
companies now must get permits to wire any section. After
two companies have obtained permits for a section, however,
62. Greater Fremont, 302 F. Supp. at 657 n.5; see also Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at
44-45. The court in Greater Fremont stated that since, "a cable with 12 wires can in
theory carry 132 messages at the same time," therefore, "132 CATV systems, each entirely independent of all the others, could in theory be earned in a cable the size of
one's thumb." 302 F. Supp. at 657 n.5. The court ignored the fact that as long as only
one cable company controlled the cable, there was, rather than a multitude of systems,
only one CATV system:
The private power of the cable system operator is potentially great, because of
the local monopoly characteristics of cable. Unless restrained in some manner, the system operator could control all of the channels on his cable system,
which could constitute the bulk of the channels of electronic communications
in a particular locale.
Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 19.
63. See, e.g., Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46; Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1039-40;
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 496 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1980),
rev'd, 7 Media L. Rptr. 1649 (10th Cir. 1981) (hereinafter Boulder II). Boulder I and
Boulder II dealt with the right of a city to bar a cable company from wiring a part of
the city so it could award franchises to competing companies. In Boulder I, the
Supreme Court ruled that cities were not immune from antitrust liability and remanded the case for a determination of whether there had been a violation of the antitrust laws. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4148. In Boulder II, decided by the court of appeals before
the Supreme Court's Boulder I decision, the court of appeals held that the prohibition
did not violate the cable company's First Amendment rights. 7 Media L. Rptr. at 19962000.
64. 485 F. Supp. at 1040. See note 63, supra, discussion of Boulder II.
65. Id. See Boulder I, 630 F.2d at 712 (Markey, J., dissenting).
66. Dawson, supra note 58, at 358-59.
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the only way a third company can obtain a permit for that section is by demonstrating that it has the support of a majority of
the residents of that section because inadequate service is being provided by either one or both of the companies already in
the area. 67
It appears that while cable television has many of the characteristics of a natural monopoly, some competition is possible
within a given area. However, there is no evidence that such
competition can ever involve more than an extremely limited
number of competitors. The trial court in Boulder I did not
envision more than a handful of cable companies,68 and there
is no instance anywhere in the country today of more than two
companies competing directly.69 Thus it does not appear possible for there to be a "wide variety of competitors vying for the
public's attention."70 Because of the greater competition
among operators, it may be more accurate to term cable television not a "natural monopoly" but, rather, a "natural
oligopoly."
C.

Services Offered by Cable Television

The first commercial cable television systems built in the
1950's served rural communities having poor or nonexistent
over-the-air reception of television broadcast signals. 71 These
systems provided either or both of two services: supplementing local broadcasting by improving the reception of local stations, and importing distant signals into communities that
were far away from the broadcasting station. 72
The next systems were built to bring a greater variety of programming into communities which already had adequate overthe-air television reception. In 1961, viewers in San Diego who
already received three local channels were given the opportunity to see all of the Los Angeles channels as well. The cable
system offered four new independent statioris which presented
67. Id. at 359.
68. See text accompanying notes 63-65, supra.
69. E.g., Dawson, supra note 58, at 359.
70. Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 20.
71. See M. HAMBURG, supra note 17, at 5. The first commercial community antenna
system was constructed in the town of Landsford, Pennsylvania. The system offered
reception of three broadcast television channels to subscribers who paid an installation charge and monthly fee. Id.
72. See id. at 7; Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 163; Columbia Pictures, 507 F.
Supp. at 415.
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sports, old movies, and reruns of old shows plus the local programming shown by the three network affiliates. 73 Today, the
San Diego system is the largest in the country, with 209,000
subscribers. 74
In most other large cities, however, the possible availability
of distant signals was not enough to attract sufficient subscribers to make construction of cable systems economically viable.
Additional programming was necessary both to bring in more
subscribers and to raise more revenue from those who did become subscribers. 75
As technology advanced, cable systems developed the capacity to offer an increasing number of channels. Whereas the
earliest cable systems offered three or four channels,76 and the
systems constructed during most of the 1960's and 1970's carried 12 channels,77 the current "state of the art" can offer 35
channels and some systems are being built to offer 50 channels
or more. 78
1. Local Origination. The first way in which cable television
companies utilized channel capacity which was not being used
for carrying television broadcast programming was through
"cablecasting,"79 the transmission to subscribers of programs
which the cable companies themselves had originated. 80 Much
of this cablecasting is of a very simple nature. For example, a
video camera will scan back and forth over time and weather
measuring instruments.81 Other systems present a full range
of programming, including both live and videotape offerings. 82
73. M. HAMBURG, supra note 17,- at 25.
74. Cable Stats, CABLEVISION, December 21, 1981 at 152.
75. See Columbia Pictures, 507 F. Supp. at 415.
76. See text accompanying notes 71, supra.
77. See Columbia Pictures, 507 F. Supp. at 422. See generally Spillman, Multiplay:
A Case oj Diminishing Returns, CABLEVISION, June I, 1981, at 137-43.
78. See Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 22; Boulder 1,485 F. Supp. at 1036; Columbia
Pictures, 507 F. Supp. at 422. The franchise agreement for New Orleans calls for 108
channels on its cable system; for Cincinnati, the agreement is for 86 channels. Panero,
The Winning Combinations: What it Took to Win in Eight Big Cities, CABLEVISION,
June I, 1981, at 310-14.
79. "Cablecasting" refers to programming distributed on the cable system which
is, "subject to the exclusive control of the cable operator." Midwest I, 406 U.S. at 653 n.6
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(w».
80. CABLE TELEVISION INFoRMATION CENTER, THE USES OF CABLE COMMUNICATIONS
9 (1973) (hereinafter USES OF CABLE). As of 1981, about 3,080 cable systems cablecasted programs. BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981).
81. USES OF CABLE, supra note 80, at 9.
82. Id.
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2. Pay Television. From 1972 on, pay television has offered
cable television stations a means to fill unused channels, attract more subscribers, and sell more services to existing subscribers. Generally, cable systems lease a channel to one of
the pay networks in exchange for royalties based on the
number of subscribers who sign up for the additional charge. 83
What the subscribers usually receive are recent movies, sports,
and some programming produced by the pay network itself.84
Pay television has proved to be extremely popular. In 1980,
over 8 million households had pay television;85 it is estimated
that by 1985 there will be between 16 million and 25 million pay
television subscribers. 86 As the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has said, "The popularity of this medium has
grown so rapidly that it is not impossible that, by the end of the
century, it. will be the prime method for viewing motion
pictures. "87
3. Public Access. With more channels available on a cable
television system than were needed to carry local and distant
television broadcast signals, interest turned toward the utilization of some of the excess channels to present programming by
those not affiliated with the cable television company, broadcast television systems, or other traditional program producers. The concept of "public access" channels, to be available
on a "first-come, first-served" basis to anyone in the community served by the cable television company,88 was seen as one
of the greatest advantages which the new cable technology
83. For example, cable systems pay Home Box Office, the largest program producer, four dollars a month for every H.B.O. subscriber plus a percentage of any amount
above seven dollars the system charges the subscriber for the pay service. January
Date Set/or HBO Rate Hike, CABLEVISION, July 13,1981, at 33. Suppliers of basic programming service, that for which the cable operator does not charge subscribers an
extra fee, charge the operator 5¢-15¢ per subscriber per month. See Howard, Satisfying
Cable's Vast Appetite/or Programming, DUN'S BUSINESS MONTH, Nov. 1981, at 84.
84. The rates subscribers are charged for pay services are unregulated. The Federal Communications Commission has both declined to regulate rates and prohibited
states from imposing such regulation. See Notice of Inquiry in Docket 20767, 58
F.C.C.2d 915 (1976), upheld in Brookhaven Cable TV v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
85. Columbia Pictures, 507 F. Supp. at 416.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 415.
88. For a description of how a public access system can be established, see W.
BAER, supra note 19, at 134-37; Buske, Improving Local Community Access Programming, PuBLIC MANAGEMENT, June, 1980, at 12-14.
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could offer. 89
In 1971, the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications issued a report on the development of cable television. 90 One of
the Commission's recommendations was the establishment of
public access channels. 91 The Commission saw public access
as a means through which individual members of a community
could communicate with the community at large:
There is a need, in every community, for the expression of
common notions, for the expression of artistic and cultural endeavors; a need to serve the elderly, the deaf, the very young; a
need for an audience that finds a resolution in more affluent
areas, in the creation of Little Theater Groups and similar associations. There is the need to express oneself in forms that
can be carried across boundaries to similar communities elsewhere, and indeed to dissimilar communities which might
profit from the expression of unfamiliar views. There is a pervasive need, in short, to be heard. 92

The Cabinet Committee on Cable Television's Report to The
President in 1974 also endorsed the idea of public access channels.93 The Cabinet Committee regarded access as essential if
cable television was to be a "constructive force in our national
life ":94
We believe that cable development has the potential of creating an electronic medium of communications more diverse,
more pluralistic, and more open, more like the print and film
media than our present broadcast system. It could provide minority groups, ethnic groups, the aged, the young, or people living in the same neighborhood an opportunity to express, and to
see expressed, their own views. Yet it would also enable all of
these groups to be exposed to the views of others, free of the
homogeneity which characterizes contemporary television programming. Cable offers countless Americans a chance to
speak for themselves and among themselves in their own way,
and a chance to share with one another their experiences, their
89. See, e.g., W. BAER, supra note 19, at 137; Barnette, State, Federal and Local
Regulation o/Cable Television, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 685, 737-38, 789-92 (1972); Bazelon,
The First Amendment and the "New Media"-New Directions in Regulating Telecommunications, 31 F.C.C. L.J. 201, 210 (1979); Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORN.
L. REV. 414, 438 (1972); Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 1008, 1035-37 (1971).
90. SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50.
91. [d. at 125.
92. [d. at 124-25.
93. Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 44 n.9.
94. [d. at 19.
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opinions, their frustrations, and their hopes. Rather than increase the alienation of individual from individual and group
from group, cable could combine the shared experience of national television with a type of active participation in the political and social process that was· common in the days before
urbanization eroded the opportunity for personal involvement
in events that affected the community.95
It is this potential for personal involvement within each com-

munity that makes public access particularly important. Not
only can local town meetings be broadcast throughout the community, but individuals and groups can comment on and respond to the issues addressed by the local governing body.96 In
fact, public access permits the raising of issues which otherwise would not be discussed in the local media at all.97
In addition to the opportunity to increase discussion of political issues, public access provides a medium for offering important services to narrow audiences, too small to be served by
current mass electronic media. Some examples of such programming include shows in sign language for the deaf, programming for the elderly, and religious programming.98
95. Id. at 15.

96. See Bell, A Different Kind o/Television, PuBLIC MANAGEMENT, June, 1980, at 57.

97. See W. BAER, supra note 19, at 2:
Citizens may speak on any subject they choose. After using portable cameras,
all sorts of groups-churches, Boy Scouts, minority groups, high school
classes, crusaders for causes-can create and show their own programs. With
public access, cable can become a medium for local action instead of a distributor of pre-packaged mass consumption programs to a passive audience.
98. See O'Connor, Reviews 0/ Major Cable Services Available in the Tri-State Area,
N.Y. Times, July 12, 1981 , 2, at 25, col. 1:
The variety of access fare in Manhattan verges on the bewildering. In the past
few weeks, the persistent browser could have visited a black Baptist church in
Brooklyn, a Jewish Passover seder, and a small Roman Catholic seminar on
the subject of "Future Wars in the Secrets of Dogma." These represented only
a fraction of the religious programming. For balance of a sort, there was the
"American Atheist New Forum," featuring the always militant Madelyn Murray O'Hare, who was claiming to detect "an extraordinary curiousity about
atheism out there." Elsewhere, there were yoga lessons with a lot of inhaling
and exhaling, weight-control lectures (''the 4 S's of a gluttonous fat person are
silver, slice, slab, and slob"), and a number of psychics, including one who
recently used tarot cards to conclude that a gentleman on the telephone was
''very concerned with money."
Access can be serious. "Communications Update" recently offered a report on
the Woodhull Medical Center in Brooklyn and the reasons for its still postpone opening. On "Building for Tomorrow," a group of black persons discussed the weapon of rent strikes.
Other cities and systems may offer more uplifting, more purely informational
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D. The Federal Communications Commission Access Rules

In May, 1976, the Federal Communications Commission
promulgated rules mandating that cable television systems
with over 3,500 subscribers make available channels for various
types of access programming. 99 The rules required cable companies to provide from their available channels a public access
channel, an education access channel, a local government access channel and a leased access channel. 100 If there was not
sufficient demand by programmers for all of those channels,
cable operators were permitted to combine one or more channels. lOl Sufficient demand was defined as access channel use,
"80 percent of the weekdays (Monday-Friday) for 80% of the
time during any consecutive three-hour period for six consecutive weeks . . . ."102
The number of available channels in a cable television system was to be calculated by subtracting from the total number
of channels the number of channels carrying television broadcast signals and already carrying pay programming. l03 Channels being used for local origination which were offered to
subscribers at no change were deemed to be "available" for access. 104 The rules also prohibited a cable television company
from using a channel which was currently available for access
to provide new pay programming. lOS
The public access channel was required to be made available
for service on a first-come first-served, nondiscriminatory basis. l06 Apart from enforcement of the Commission's prohibition against advertising and obscene or indecent programming,
there was to be no control by the cable television operator of
the content of the programs on the access channel. 107 There
forms of access content, but somehow the crazy, unpredictable mix to be
found in Manhattan manages to capture a fairly accurate reflection of the
area's perhaps unique diversity.
See also USES OF CABLE, supra note 80, at 22.
99. These rules appear in Report and Order, Docket 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976)
(hereinafter 1976 Report) and were deleted in 45 Fed. Reg. 76, 178 (1980) pursuant to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Midwest II, see text accompanying notes 123-26 i7ifra.
100. See 1976 Report, supra note 99, at 327 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.254(a) (1976».
101. See id. at 327-28 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.254(b) (1976».
102. [d. at 328 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.254(d) (1976».
103.· See id. at 315.
104. See id. at 315-16.
105. See id. at 316-17.
106. See id. at 328 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.256(d) (1976».
107. See id. at 328 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.256(b) (1976».
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was to be at least one public access channel for use without
charge.
In addition to providing the channel for access programming,
the cable television company also had to provide a studio with
"some inhouse capacity for members of the public to record
programming...."108 The cable company was permitted to
make reasonable charges for equipment and production of the
public access programs, but in no instance was a charge permitted for live public access programming if less than five minutes in length. l09
The Commission concluded that while there were both direct costs and opportunity costs associated with the provision
of access channels, these costs were outweighed by the public
benefits.l1O The access channels, if used properly, would:
result in the opening of new outlets for local expression, aid in
the promotion of diversity in television programming, act in
some measure to restore a sense of community to cable subscribers and a sense of openness and participation to the video
medium, aid in the functioning of democratic institutions, and
improve the informational and educational communications resources of cable television communities. III

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined the
constitutionality of the public access requirements in Midwest
Video Corporation v. FCC .112 While striking down the rules as
beyond the F.C.C.'s jurisdiction, the court said that, "Were it
.necessary to decide the issue, the present record would render
the intrusion by the present rules constitutionally
impermissible. "113
The court held that cablecasting was communication protected by the First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom of the press clauses. 1l4 Specifically, the court found no
distinction between cable systems and newspapers in determining the government's power to require public access. 1l5 Relying on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,1l6 the court
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

[d. at 317, 328 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(a) (3) (1976».
See id. at 328 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(c)(3) (1976».
See id. at 296.
[d.
571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), ajf'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
[d. at 1056.
[d. at 1054 & n.70.
[d. at 1056.
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
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ruled that public access rules impermissibly require cable operators "who have invested substantially to create a private
electronic 'publication'-a means of disseminating information-, to open their 'publications' to all for use as they
wish."u7 The Commission's access rules were condemned because they removed all editorial discretion from the cable system owner both as to who could use the system and what
programming material was shown. us
The court stated that even though there may be only one
cable company in a community, such scarcity would not warrant the access requirements. Again relying on Tornillo, the
court said,
[Scarcity] which is the result solely of economic conditions is
apparently insufficient to justify even limited government intrusion into the First Amendment rights of the conventional
press, . . . and there is nothing in the record before us to suggest a constitutional distinction between cable television and
newspapers on this point. u9

The Federal Communications Commission was also faulted
for failing to decide whether cable systems are public forums. 120 If the systems were not public forums, the court said,
it would appear that access requirements would be unconstitutional: "Every individual's right to speak, precious and paramount as it is, does not include every individual's right to be
given the possibility of an audience by government fiat, or to
speak in a non-pUblic forum like a newspaper, a magazine, or
on the Senate fioor."121
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision
voiding the public access rules, but based its holding entirely
on a finding that the rules exceeded the Commission's jurisdiction. 122 The Court said that public access requirements imposed common carrier obligations on cable operators. 123 The
117. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d at 1056. (emphasis in original).
118. See id. at 1055.
119. Id. (quoting Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46) (citations omitted).
120. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d at 1054.
121. Id. The court also criticized the F.C.C. for not explaining why compelled access
to cable facilities differed, in terms of First Amendment analysis, from compelled access to broadcast facilities. Id. at 1055. The court did not explain, however; either the
relevance of the comparison or whether, in fact, compelled access to broadcast facilities would be per se unconstitutional. Cj. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 114, 101 S. Ct. 2813
(1981) (federal candidates have enforceable right of access to broadcast stations).
122. See 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
123. See id. at 700-702.
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Communications Act of 1934,124 the Court held, barred the
Commission from compelling broadcasters, including cable operators, to act as common carriers, even for only a portion of
their total services. 125
In reaching its decision, the Court did not discuss the merits
of the Eighth Circuit First Amendment analysis. In a footnote,
the Court said: "The court below suggested that the Commission's rules might violate the First Amendment rights of cable
operators. Because our decision rests on statutory grounds,
we express no view on that question, save to acknowledge that
it is not frivolous and to make clear that the asserted constitutional issue did not determine or sharply influence our construction of the statute."126
F. The Eighth Circuit's Mis-Analysis

The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the constitutionality of public access requirements for cable television systems was based
on a misreading of Tornillo and a simplistic interpretation of
First Amendment law. By relying solely on a decision concerning access to newspapers, the court violated the admonition
given by Justice Stewart in a different access case, Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee:
"The problem before us. . . is too complex to admit of solution
by simply analogizing to cases in very different areas."127
The fundamental error made by the Eighth Circuit was in
assuming that the rules governing the constitutionality of mandated access to newspapers applied a fortiori to public access
on cable television. It is a settled principle of constitutional
analysis that each medium of expression presents its own special First Amendment problems. 128 Newspapers,129 movies,130
television,131 radio,132 and billboards 133 each require a separate
124. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h).
125. See Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 705 & n.15.
126. [d. at 709 n.19.
127. 412 U.S. 94, 134 (1973) (concurring opinion).
128. See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557, (1975)
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., 367, 386.
129. See Miami Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-58.
130. See Burnstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 503. In 1915, in fact, the Supreme Court
ruled that movies were merely, "spectacles, not to be regarded ... as part of the press
of the country or as organs of public opinion." Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 245 (1915).
131. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386.
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and distinct set of First Amendment rules. While prior review
by a government agency of movies might be constitutional,134
such review of books is blatantly unconstitutional. 135 Although
the First Amendment prevents newspaper publishers from being forced to print the replies of political candidates they criticize,136 it permits a requirement that those who control
television channels provide equal time to the· candidates they
criticize. 137 As Justice White stated in Metromedia, Inc. v. City
of San Diego :138 "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a
law unto itself and that law must reflect the 'differing natures,
values, abuses and dangers' of each method."139
When the Supreme Court in Tornillo unanimously struck
down the Florida law which required a newspaper to print the
responses of political candidates to its attacks, the Court did
not condemn all access requirements per se, but relied on the
special history and characteristics of newspapers as a form of
communication. l40 Indeed, the Court did not even mention its
decision only five years earlier in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC,141 which rejected a challenge to the equal time rules to
which television broadcasters are subject. Justice White made
clear in his concurrence in Tornillo that the blanket prohibition against access requirements is limited to newspapers:
"According to our accepted jurisprudence, the First Amendment erects a virtually insurmountable bamer between government and the print media so far as government tampering,
in advance of publication, with news and editorial content is
132. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
133. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
134. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (struck down law requiring prior
review of movies because it did not provide for a Sufficiently speedy review; Times
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (ordinance requiring prior review of
films is not per se unconstitutional).
135. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). The Court distinguished
Bantam Books from its Times Film decision by saying, "Furthermore, the holding was
expressly confined to motion pictures." [d. at 70 n.10.
136. See Miami Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
137. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
138. 453 U.S. 490 101, S. Ct. 2882 (1981) (Justice White wrote the opinion for a fourpel'Son plurality, striking down a city ban on some commercial and all noncommercial
advertising on billboards).
139. [d. at 2889. (quoting Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949». Justice Stevens joined this part of the plurality opinion, 101 S.
Ct. at 2909; accordingly a majority of the Court supported this statement.
140. Miami Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-58. See text accompanying
notes 157-158, infra.
141. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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concerned.,,142
The Supreme Court specifically refused to extend its
Tornillo ruling to all access cases in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins. 143 That case upheld a California constitutional provision which permitted individuals to exercise free
speech and petition rights in a privately owned shopping
center. The Court rejected the argument that Tornillo compelled a holding that the First Amendment rights of the owners
of the shopping center were violated when the state required
them to permit those with whom they disagreed to use their
property as a pulpit:
[Tornillo] rests on the principle that the State cannot tell a
newspaper what it must print. The Florida statute contravened
this principle in that it, "enact [ed] a penalty on the basis of the
content of a newspaper." There was also a danger in Tornillo
that the statute would "damp [en] the vigor and [limit] the variety of public debate" by deterring editors from publishing
controversial political statements that might trigger the application of the statute. Thus, the statute was found to be an "intrusion into the function of editors." These concerns obviously
are not present here. l44

Those concerns also do not apply to cable television access
rules. In requiring that a cable system set aside a separate
channel for those who wish to publicize their views, there is no
"penalty" assessed against the cable operator because of the
content of any other programming shown on the cable system.
Similarly, there is no danger that an access requirement will
impair either the vigor or variety of debate on cable television
since the requirement is not dependent on the cable operator
exhibiting controversial programming.
To apply the holding in Tornillo to any question concerning
cable television is particularly inapposite in light of the dispositive statement made at the end of that decision:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply
with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo
publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the
Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A
newspaper is more than a passive receptable or conduit for
news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go
142. 418 U.S. at 259 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
143. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
144. [d. at 88 (citations omitted).
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into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on
the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials-whether fair or unfair--constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time. 145
While a newspaper is not a ''passive receptacle or conduit,"
the Supreme Court has ruled that a cable television system, at
least in regard to its carriage of television broadcast signals, is
a "nonperformer"l46 and a ''passive beneficiary."147 In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 148 the Court
held that a cable television system did not infringe the copyright of movie producers whose films it transmitted to its subscribers when it carried a local television broadcast channel.
The Court said that, unlike broadcasters who select the programs to be seen on their channels, cable television systems
"simply carry, without editing, whatever programs they receive."149 Therefore, the Court concluded, cable television operators, "like viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not perform
the programs that they receive and carry."150
The Court affirmed the essentially passive role of cable television systems in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcast
System, Inc. 151 In Teleprompter, creators and producers of
copyrighted television programs argued that cable television
operators became active performers when the operators decided which distant channels to carry and when the operators
offered their own programming in addition to local broadcast
signals. The Court rejected both arguments. The Court held
that,
Even in exercising its limited freedom to choose among various
broadcasting stations, a CATV operator simply cannot be
viewed as 'selecting,' 'procuring,' and 'propagating' broadcast
signals ... An operator of a CATV system ... makes a choice
as to which broadcast signals to rechannel to its subscribers,
and its creative function is then extinguished. 152
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

418 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added).
Teleprompter CorP. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 409 (1974).
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artist Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399 (1968).
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
[d. at 400.
[d. at 400-01.
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
[d. at 410.
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The Court held that the fact that a cable television operator
produces and displays its own programming also does not
transform the operator into a "performer" for the other programs it offers. Even though the operator-produced programming was sold as a package with the carriage of local broadcast
signals, "they remain separate and different operations, and we
cannot sensibly say that the system becomes a 'performer' of
the broadcast programming when it offers both origination and
reception services, but remains a nonperformer when it offers
only the latter."153
The Eighth Circuit also misinterpreted the Tornillo decision's holding as to the effect of "economic" scarcity rather
than "physical" scarcity on First Amendment rights. The court
stated that Tornillo held that scarcity resulting solely from economic conditions is insufficient to justify even limited government intrusion into the First Amendment rights of the
"conventional press" and that cable television and newspapers
were constitutionally indistinguishable on this point. 154
The Tornillo decision, however, did not enunciate a constitutional ruling of the irrelevance of economic scarcity. Rather,
the Court held that the fact that economic conditions caused
"newspaper monopolies"155 to exist in many cities did not alter
the First Amendment rights of newspapers: "If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation with
the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial
gloss on that Amendment developed over the years."156 In
153. [d. at 405 (quoting the lower court opinion, 476 F.2d 338, 347 (2nd Cir. 1973». In
Midwest II, the Supreme Court stated:
Cable operators now share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial
discretion regarding what their programming will include. As the Commission, itself, has observed, "both in their signal carriage decisions and in connection with their origination function, cable television systems are afforded
considerable control over the content of the programming they provide." Report and Order in Docket No. 20829, 43 Fed. Reg. 53742 (1978).
440 U.S. at 707. The Court added that the discretion exercised by cable operators was
not necessarily coextensive with that of broadcasters: "We do not suggest, nor do we
find it necessary to conclude, that the discretion exercised by cable operators is of the
same magnitude as that enjoyed by broadcasters." [d. at 707 n.17.
The Court in Midwest II did not reject the holdings in Fortnightly and Teleprompter;
in fact, the Court did not even mention those decisions. Cable television, then, may be
said to display traits in common with both passive and active media. Accordingly, the
holding in Tornillo, based on the self-evident non-passive nature of newspapers, cannot apply ipso facto to cable television systems.
154. 571 F.2d at 1055. See text accompanying note 120, supra.
155. 418 U.S. at 253.
156. [d. at 254.
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describing the "judicial gloss;" the Court limited its discussion,
in large part, to cases detailing the First Amendment rights of
newspapers, not of all media in general. I57
That economic scarcity can indeed be a factor in determining
the permissible range of government regulation of a medium of
communication was indicated by the Supreme Court in its Red
Lion decision. In discussing the scarcity of the airwaves, the
Court acknowledged that occasionally various wavelengths are
left unused. I5s The Court held that this did not negate the governmental interest in regulating the broadcast media: "The
substantial capital investment required for many uses, in addition to the potentiality for confusion and interference inherent
in any scheme for continuous kaleidoscopic reallocation of all
available space may make this unfeasible."159
The Court also held that the fact that existing stations could
conceivably face direct competition by a new station did not
prevent the government from requiring a broadcaster to give
equal time to opposing viewpoints. The Court stated that the
existing stations would have a "substantial advantage" over a
new station, including confirmed habits of listeners and viewers, network affiliation, and greater experience in broadcasting. I60 Because these advantages were "the fruit of a preferred
position conferred by the Government," the Court said the possibility of competition by new stations was insufficient "to
render unconstitutional the Government's effort to assure that
a broadcaster's programming ranges widely enough to serve
157. Id. at 254-57. The cases which the Court cited as creating this "judicial gloss"
were: Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (which held that antitrust
laws apply to newspapers); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (which held that
the First Amendment does not give a newspaper reporter immunity from a grand jury
subpoena); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413
U.S. 376 (1973) (which prohibited the use of discriminatory classified advertising in a
newspaper); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971)
(which held that a newspaper cannot be forced to publish an advertisement without
editorial control); and Grosjean v. American Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (which prohibited
a tax on the gross receipts of newspapers with a large circulation). The only other
cases cited were CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973)
(which was cited for its position, "strongly adverse to any attempt to extend a right of
access to newspapers," 418 U.S. at 255; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964) (which was cited for its condemnation of government action which decreases
the energy and variety of public debate); and Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966)
(which was cited for its statement that a major purpose of the First Amendment was to
protect discussion of governmental affairs in general, candidates in particular).
158. 395 U.S. at 398-400.
159. Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 400.
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the public interest."161
The precise effect on First Amendment rights of different
media due to scarcity caused by economic factors remains undecided. Nonetheless, it is incorrect to say that economic realities can never be considered in determining the
constitutionality of a governmental attempt to ''preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
market."162
.
The final error the Eighth Circuit made in its analysis of the
constitutionality of the cable access rules was its arbitrary
statement that unless cable systems were deemed to be "public forums" the rules could not pass constitutional muster.163
While the Eighth Circuit was correct in its view that the First
Amendment does not give every individual the right to use any
private property or means of communication belonging to
someone else without the owner's permission,164 it was incorrect to assume that all access decisions must rest on a determination of whether or not a medium is a ''public forum." In
deciding the constitutionality of access requirements to radio
and television, for example, the Supreme Court has utilized an
entirely different categorization. Certain types of access may
be permitted, the Court has held, because those who control
those scarce frequencies are "proxies"165 and "fiduciaries,,166
for the entire community: "A license permits broadcasting, but
the licensee has no constitutional right to. . . monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens."167

II
The First Amendment Characteristics of
Cablecasting
Before beginning an analysis of whether access requirements infringe the First Amendment rights of cable television
161. Id.
162. Id. at 390.
163. See 571 F.2d at 1054.
164. See United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations,
453 U.S. 114, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981) (mailbox not a public forum); Lloyd v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972) (private shopping center not a public forum).
165. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 394.
166. Id. at 389.
167. Id. See Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 101 S. Ct. 2813,
2829 (1981).
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operators,168 it would be useful to determine the nature of
those rights and whether they are coextensive with the rights
of either of two media whose rights have been fairly well delineated by the Supreme Court: newspapers and television. However, while such a determination may help clarify the nature of
the issue in question, it will not resolve the issue.
Some courts have specifically held that cable television is a
speaker protected by the First Amendment. 16g The California
Supreme Court ruled that a total ban on pay subscription television was an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of expression. 170 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that rules limiting the type and amount of pay
programming on cable television violated cablecasters' First
Amendment rights. l7l
Though cable television operators are undoubtedly involved
in communications and thereby fall under the umbrella of the
First Amendment,172 the relationship of the cable operator to
the programs that are carried complicates the question of
whether "cablecasting" is speech. In Teleprompter, the
Supreme Court recognized the fundamental difference between different types of programming carried over the cables.
The Court stated that while it was "undisputed" that cable television operators who originate their own programming "perform" that programming, the same cable operators are
nonperformers of the off-the-air programming they receive
from broadcasters. 173 The variation in the control held by the
cable television operator over the different channels was acknowledged by the Court in Midwest II: "A cable system may
operate as a common carrier ...vith respect to a portion of its
168. The First Amendment guarantee for free speech is made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 547; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
169. See, e.g., Weaverv. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 242, 411 P.2d 289, 294, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 844 (1966); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46; Boulder II, 496 F. Supp. at
828.
170. Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d at 249, 411 P.2d at 299.
171. H.B.O., 567 F.2d at 49-50.
172. Cable television operators do not lose their first amendment rights either because they are regulated by the government, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.l (1980), they exhibit, in large part, entertainment
programming, Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 2181
(1981), or their communication requires a great expenditure of money, Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
173. 415 U.S. at 404-05.
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service only."174
Cable television performs many different functions and
there may be different constitutional protections for each of
those different functions. A cable television operator who produces and exhibits his own programming is certainly entitled
to the same protection as any other producer of programming.
However, it is the cable operator's capacity as producer which
is the source of that protection. It is the cable operator's role
as distributor of programming which has yet to be defined. 175
A. Neither Newspaper Nor Broadcast Television

Newspapers and television broadcasters are both "distributors" of information, yet they are afforded quite different protection by the First Amendment. Although they have much in
common, they are not in the same category in terms of the obligations imposed, or which could be imposed, by law. 176 Cable
television possesses attributes which can be categorized as
similar on the one hand to a newspaper, and on the other hand
to a television broadcaster. However, neither analogy is complete enough to permit a wholesale transposition of constitutional protection of either medium to cable television.
Cable television shares with newspapers a capacity for
presenting a wide variety of information and issues simultaneously.l77 Unlike traditional television broadcasters, a cable television operator has numerous channels at his disposal,178
Like a newspaper, a cable television operator can present information of interest to relatively small sections of the. population and not compel one subgroup to endure a discussion of a
174. 440 U.S. at 701 n.9. See National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
175. "[W)e have said that in our view cable systems 'are neither broadcasters nor
common carriers within the meaning of the Communications Act' but rather that
'cable is a hybrid that receives identification and regulation as a separate force in communications.''' 1976 Report, supra note 99, at 299.
176. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d
994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public
Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1,
36 (1976) (this article took the position that the differing First Amendment protections
furthered two distinct First Amendment goals: "a,ccess in a highly concentrated press
and minimal governmental intervention.").
177. See generally Note, supra note 12, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 146-47. See also Boulder
II, 496 F. Supp. at 829-30.
178. See text accompanying note 78, supra.
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matter of concern only to a different groUp.179 Newspaper readers can turn the page to a different article; cable subscribers
can switch the channel. 180
Cable television and newspapers are also not subject to the
same physical limitation of the airwaves as are television and
radio broadcasters. Government regulation originally was imposed on radio broadcasters because unregulated use of frequencies caused intolerable interference: "With everybody on
the air, nobody could be heard."18l In contrast, the cables of a
cable television distribution system are either strung on poles
or placed in the ground, and two cables can lie side-by-side
without causing the same type of interference. 182
However, there are important differences between cable television and newspapers which will affect the nature of the constitutional protection each medium is afforded. For example,
cable television systems are not as "unlimited" as newspapers.
First, there is a limit as to how many times a municipality will
want its streets torn Up,183 and a limit as to how many cables a
telephone pole will hold. 184 Second, because of its economic
and technological structure, cable television may be inherently
oligopolistic. 185 Finally, there is the enormous difference in
cost of production. 186 Newspapers constitute just one segment
of the written media; pamphlets, leaflets, and fliers can all be
179. See SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50, at 43-44.
180. See id.

181. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943).
182. See Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1038.
183. Even if overground cables are strung, there can be great difficulty with having

more than one cable company. The town of East Greenbush, N.Y. awarded directly
competing franchises to two cable television companies. The commencement of service was delayed while the companies tried to agree on the logistics of their wirings.
Additionally, the use of two cables, rather than one, required that several utility poles
be replaced. Cable Competition Failing to Hasten Service in E.G., Greenbush Area
News, March 16, '1977, at 1, col. 1. Today, there is only one cable company operating in
East Greenbush, see New York State Commission on Cable Television, supra note 18,
at 245.
184. The most commonly used poles are 35-40 feet long with a usable space of 11-16
feet. Cables use one foot of pole space and there must be at least 40 inches of "safety
space" between the electric lines and the communications cable. See Adoption of
Rulesfor the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, Docket 78-144, Memorandum Opinion and Second Report and Order, 72 F.C.C.2d 59, 68-70 (1979); Gillespie,
Pole Attachments: Still Listening For Joshua, CABLEVISION, July 27, 1981 at 65. See also
Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1038.
.
185. See text accompanying notes 50-70, supra.
186. SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50, at 45-46.
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produced without great expense. 187 While there may be only
one general circulation newspaper in a city, there are numerous weekly newspapers, special interest newspapers, and
magazines and journals available in the same city to compete
with the newspaper.188 Ownership of a cable television system,
though, is out of reach of all but the wealthiest. 189 There is
nothing in the cable television field comparable to the magazine or pamphlet. 190 While a program could be produced as
inexpensively as a small publication, the distribution system is
available to only a few. Journals can be mailed to subscribers
for a few cents each. A cable program can only be distributed
through an integrated cable system.
Another fundamental difference between cable television
and newspapers is their relationship with the municipalities in
which they operate. 19l Because cable systems must use public
streets, they must receive governmental approval before they
begin to communicate with the public. 192 Thus they are involved with government in a way in which newspapers are
not. 193 By awarding only one franchise, or even by awarding a
limited number of franchises, the government is protecting the
cable company from competition. 194 The newspaper does not
need official approval to publish, and must survive or perish in
the open marketplace. Cable companies cannot cease service
or transfer ownership unless permitted to do so by the local
governing body.195 With the exception of restrictions placed by
antitrust laws,196 newspapers are generally permitted to conduct business as they please. In short, cable television has a
187. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
842 (1970).
188. In 1974, when the Supreme Court in Tornillo discussed the problem of a newspaper monopoly in Miami, 418 U.S. at 248-50, there were three daily newspapers in the
city in addition to the Miami Herald (the News, Review, and Diario Las Americas), 18
weekly, bi-weekly, or tri-weekly newspapers, and 24 monthly publications. See N.W.
AYER DIRECTORY OF PuBLICATIONS, 240-42 (1974).
189. See text accompanying notes 28-38, supra.
190. SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50 at 93.
191. Boulder II, 7 Media L. Rptr. at 1999.
192. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-331(a) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
26, § 601(a) (1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2006 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. AJ'iN. tit. 30,
§ 503(a) (Supp. 1981).
193. Boulder II, 7 Media L. Rptr. at 1998.
194. Boulder II, 496 F. Supp. at 829.
195. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 26, § 609(A) (1980); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
166A § 7 (West, Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:5A~43 (West Supp. 1980); N:Y. EXEC.
LAw § 822 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
196. See Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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history of regulation by the government; conversely, there is a
"virtually insurmountable barrier" between government and
newspapers.197
A third distinction between cable television and newspapers
is that cable television is intimately connected with that other
heavily regulated medium-broadcast television. 198 Cable television arose in large part due to a public demand for improved
television broadcast service,199 and cable systems use the
broadcast signals as ''the backbone of the service they provide."2°O There is also an obvious facial similarity between
cable and broadcast television. Cablecasted and broadcasted
programs "look" the same and both are exhibited via the home
television set.201 Additionally, both cable and broadcast television share a relative scarcity of outlets in any given community
and a resultant history of government regulation. 202
197. Tornillo, 418 u.s. at 259 (White, J., concurring). While the Court in Tornillo
struck down a law requiring newspapers to publish that which, ''reason tells them
should not be published," id. at 256, a Federal Communications Commission rule requiring cable operators to carry, upon a broadcaster's request, local television signals
whenever the cable operator imported competing signals has been found to be constitutional, see Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968) (cited approvingly in Midwest 1,406 U.S. at 659 n.17 (plurality opinion». The Court in Midwest II
distinguished the rule from an access requirement because the signal carriage rule,
''was limited to remedying a specific perceived evil and thus involved a balance of considerations not addressed by [the access rules ]." 440 U.S. at 706 n.16. This distinction,
which led to a finding that the FCC lacked authority to promulgate the access rules,
was based on a finding, not that access rules did not remedy any evil, but rather that
these rules did not remedy an evil which the Commission had jurisdiction to combat.
By contrast, the signal carriage rule, whose purpose was to prevent the impairment of
service offered by television broadcasters, was ''reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's responsibilities for regulating broadcast television. Id. at 697.
198. See Midwest 1,406 U.S. at 664-65.
199. Id. at 665. See Second Report and Order, Docket 14895, 15233 and 15971, 2
F.C.C.2d 725, 745 (1966).
200. First Report and Order in Docket 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 222 (1969).
20l. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
summary aJf'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
In upholding a ban on cigarette advertising on "any medium of electronic communication," the court said, "The unique characteristics of electronic communication make it .
especially subject to regulation in the public interest."
202. Compare NBC, 319 U.S. at 212 with text accompanying notes 50-70, supra. As
Chief Justice (then Circuit Judge) Burger stated in OjJice of Communications of the
United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003:
The argument that a broadcaster is not a public utility is beside the point.
True it is not a public utility in the same sense as strictly regulated common
carriers or purveyors of power, but neither is it a purely private enterprise like
a newspaper or an automobile agency.
Similarly, cable television is not a "purely" private enterprise. See text accompanying
notes 193-198, supra.
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There are, however, numerous differences between the two
media which may have constitutional significance. First, the
interest of the federal government in regulating the airwaves is
not identical to the interest of the municipal government in
regulating its streets. The airwaves, used for communication,
must be distributed so as to serve "the public interest.''203 A
municipality has a more limited, or, in the words of one court,
"parochial," interest in keeping its streets and alleyways open
for travel by its inhabitants. 204
Second, the economics of the two media differ. Broadcast
television operators have only one channel at their disposal
and cannot appeal to specialized audiences; by appealing to
minority tastes, the broadcaster risks losing the larger audience composed of many specialized, minority audiences. 205
But the cable operator, with several channels to program and
with revenue directly tied to the number of subscribers, can
offer a variety of programming: some "mainstream," and some
with only a limited appeaI,206 Hence, the economics of cable television can lead, at least in part, to greater diversity in programming than occurs in broadcast television.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC 2 0 7 , in deliniating the difference between
cable and broadcast television, stressed that cable television
lacked the "physical interference and scarcity requiring an umpiring role for government."208 The court stated there was not
a problem of "physical scarcity of channels' relative to the
number of persons who may seek access to the cable system."209 The court also said that the only barrier to the number
of cable operators was economic, as there was no ''readily apparent barrier of physical or electrical interference to operation of a number of cable systems in a given locality."210
It is incorrect to rely on the number of channels made avail203. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
204. Boulder II, 496 F. Supp. 823, 828.
205. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d at 1100 n.76.
206. See Note, supra note 12, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 135-37.
207. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
208. Id. at 45.
209. Id. This was also the hope of Justice Douglas: "Scarcity may soon be a constraint of the past, thus obviating the concerns expressed in Red Lion. It has been
predicted that it may be possible within 10 years to provide television viewers 400
channels through the advances of cable television." CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 158 n.8 (conCurring opinion).
210. 567 F.2d at 46 (emphasis added).
.
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able by cable television to reach a conclusion that there is no
problem with scarcity. If there is only one owner of all those
channels, there is only one outlet for cable programming and
only one operator deciding what will appear on cable
television. 211
The court of appeals also erred when it found that because
there is no physical obstacle to operation of "a number" of
cable systems, the only cause of a cable television scarcity is
economic. Even if a limited number, that is, in excess of one
cable company, is theoretically possible in a town, that is quite
different from the physically unlimited number of newspapers,
magazines, and pamphlets that theoretically can be distributed
in a locality.212
The court was correct, though, in its recognition that the
physical scarcity of broadcast television is of a different nature
than that of cable television. 213 That difference, along with the
disparity in the type and amount of programming which can be
offered on the two media, requires a distinct and separate analysis of First Amendment considerations for cable television.
B. Public Access and First Amendment Interests

The correct starting point for resolving the question of
whether public access requirements for cable television syste~s are constitutional can be found in a case which raised the
question of the First Amendment rights of another untraditional "speaker"----corporations. In First National Bank oj Boston v. Bellotti,214 the Supreme Court struck down as
unconstitutional a Massachusetts law which prohibited corporations from making contributions or expenditures to influence
the outcome of any election or referendum unless the referendum "materially" affected the corporation's business or assets.
The Court said that the lower court had incorrectly framed the
principal question whether, and to what extent, corporations
have First Amendment rights:
The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of
the party seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in
particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper
211. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry,
3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI., 98, 107 (1972).
.
212. See text accompanying note 189, supra.
213. See text accompanying n'otes 182-183, supra.
214. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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question therefore is not whether corporations "have" First
Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive
with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be
whether [the law] abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to protect. 215
Similarly, the principal question for determining the constitutionality of public access requirements is not whether cable
television operators "have" First Amendment rights and, if so,
whether they are coextensive with those of newspapers or
broadcast television. Instead, the question must be whether
public access requirements abridge expression that the First
Amendment was meant to protect.
One of the primary purposes of the First Amendment is "informational"216-to provide that all citizens understand the issues of the day so as to be fit to govern themselves under their
own institutions.217 Professor Thomas 1. Emerson described
freedom of expression as ''the best process for advancing
knowledge and discovering truth."218 Accordingly, there is a
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen...."219
In order for the marketplace of ideas to function properly
and for the free trade in thoughts and concepts to result in the
attainment of truth,220 there must be available in the marketplace the full range of "goods," to wit, ideas. There is there~ore
a corollary to the informational purpose, a First Amendment
goal of achieving a diversity of vendors of ideas.221 As the
215. [d. at 776.
216. [d. at 782 n.18.
217. [d. at 776. (speech about public issues "is at the herat of the First Amend-

ment's protection."); see Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 534 ("Freedom of speech
is 'indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth,' Whitney v. California,
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 14
(1976) (''The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expression in order 'to assure [the J unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
484 (1957)"); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GoVERNMENT 8889 (1948).
218. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 7 (1966).
219. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
220. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
R. POSNER, supra note 52, at 308.
221. See FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795
(1978); Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 4 (1949) (''The right to speak freely and to
promote diversity of ideas and programs is . . . one of the chief distinctions that sets
us apart from totalitarian regimes.").
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Supreme Court stated in Associated Press v. United States,222
the First Amendment ''rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public. . . ."223
In Buckley v. Valeo, 224 the Court upheld the constitutionality
of Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code which provided for
public financing of presidential elections. The Court said that
while government must remain absolutely neutral in matters
of religion, even to the point that government may not aid all
religions, this principle of nonintervention is not carried over
in toto to matters of free speech.225 Subtitle H did not violate
the First Amendment because it was an "effort, not to abridge,
restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to
facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in
the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people.
Thus, Subtitle H furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amendment values.,,226
Public access requirements for cable television systems
serve to further the informational function of the First Amendment.227 The marketplace of ideas is enhanced by the increase
in the number of speakers and the variety of viewpoints they
represent. As one commentator has pointed out:
The public access channel, for the first time, guarantees the
right of community participation at the individual level, even
by individuals without organizational ties or portfolio. The
range of possible programming is limited only by production
costs. Thus, a wider spectrum of subjects than on any other
cable channel is possible.228

In Bellotti, the Court stated that "[the] individual's interest
in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment separate from the concern for open and informed discussion, al222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

326 U.S. 1 (1945).
Id. at 20.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 92.
Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added).
See Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 19:
If cable is to become a constructive force in our national life, it must be open to
all Americans. There must be relatively easy access ... for those who wish to
promote their ideas, state their views, or sell their goods and services. . . .
This unfettered flow of information is central to freedom of speech and freedom of the press which have been described correctly as the freedoms upon
which all of our other rights depend.
228. USES OF CABLE, supra note 80, at 21.
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though the two often converge."229 Professor Emerson has
written that the right to freedom of expression is justified primarily as a method of assuring individual self-fulfillment, and
that this right is based on two fundamental principles: first,
that it is the purpose of society and government to promote the
welfare of the individual; and second, that it "is the principle of
equality, formulated as the proposition that every individual is
entitled to equal opportunity to share in common decisions
which affect him."230
To set aside one channel of a cable television system for public access use by definition furthers the individual's interest in
self-expression. It permits many individuals for the first time
to communicate with their communities through television. 231
Public access fulfills the "pervasive need" to be heard.
In addition to the individual's right to speak is the correlative
right to receive information and ideas.232 The Supreme Court
has ruled, "[f]reedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker.
But where a speaker exists ... the protection afforded is to the
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."233
The cable television subscriber's interest in receiving information and ideas is advanced by the creation of a public access
channel. Public access programming, since it is created by a
broad cross-section of the community, can reflect communityheld interests and values.234 It creates an alternative to programs of more general interest which are offered on other
cable channels.
229. 435 U.S. at 777 n.12. Accord Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 534 n.2. Of
course, this is not an unlimited right; the First Amendment does not provide " 'that
people who want to propagandize their protests or views have a constitutional right to
do so whenever and however they please.'" Council oj Greenburg Civic Associations,
- U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2686-87 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) and
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966».
230. T. EMERSON, supra note 219, at 4-5.
231. See W. BAER, supra note 19, at 134.
232. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756
(1976). Accord CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2830; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783; Linmark
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977); Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972).
233. Va. State Bd. oj Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756.
234. See Bell, supra note 96, at 5; Bond, Regulation jor Access, PuBuc MANAGEMENT, June, 1980, at 19. The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of encouraging communication on a local level, describing ''the heart of the natural right of the
members of an organized society, united for their common good, to impart and acquire
information about their common interests." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233, 243 (1936).
.
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A final function served by the First Amendment guarantee of
freedom of speech is that of protecting the peace within the
community itself.235 The Supreme Court has recognized that
the opportunity for free and open airing of contemporary issues, "to the end that government may be responsive to the
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.,,236
This theory of "social control" is premised on the principle
that once all members of society have had the opportunity to
express their positions on an issue and to attempt to persuade
others to agree with them, those who fail to prevail on the issue
will be more willing to accept the common judgment:
They will recognize that they have been treated fairly, in accordance with rational rules for social living. They will feel
that they have done all within their power, and will understand
that the only remaining alternative is to abandon the ground
rules altogether through resort to force, a course of action upon
which most individuals in a healthy society are unwilling to
embark. In many circumstances they will retain the opportunity to try again and will hope in the end to persuade a majority to their position.237

The availability of a public access channel can further this
goal and ease some of the tension that exists in many communities. Many people feel alienated from traditional broadcast
television and believe that much, if not all, of the programming
is unresponsive to their individual needs and the needs of their
community.238 A public access channel permits community
members to communicate effectively with one another.239 One
observer explains that cable television presents a unique opportunity for residents of poor and disadvantaged neighborhoods in particular by "alleviating the profound feeling of
voicelessness, through abundant channels and open access for
the presentation of all views."240
Although cable access requirements further many of the
235. See T. EMERSON, supra note 219, at 11-13.
236. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
237. T. EMERSON, supra note 219, at 12-13.
238. See F. F'RIENDLY, DuE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL ... 266-300
(1968); N. JOHNSON, How TO TALK BACK TO YOUR TELEVISION SET 152 (1970); Bazelon,
supra note 89, at 209.
239. See SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50, at 126.
240. Parting Words, CABLEVISION, Dec. 15, 1980, at 264 (quoting Ralph Lee Smith).
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purposes of the First Amendment, those rules may not advance those objectives in a manner inconsistent with the Constitution.241 One question which access requirements appear
to raise concerns the First Amendment right of cable operators
to refrain from speaking.242 In West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette 243 and in Wooley v. Maynard,244 the
Supreme Court struck down state laws which required private
individuals to either affirm or disseminate the advancement of
ideas with which they disagreed. Barnette involved a compulsory flag salute in public schools, and Wooley dealt with a New
Hampshire law which required state license plates to carry the
slogan "Live Free or Die." These decisions rested on the fundamental principle that" [a] system which secures the right to
proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such
concepts.,,245
.
The holdings in these cases, however, do not require a finding that cable access rules would be unconstitutional as well.
The Supreme Court, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins ,246 pointed out the differences between these ''right to refrain from speaking" decisions and a state law designating a
private shopping center as a forum for the speech of others.
Those differences make Barnette and Wooley inapplicable to
both the shopping center case and any analysis of the constitutionality of a law designating a cable television channel as a
forum for the speech of others.
The first difference was that the law in Wooley required that
a message be displayed on personal property that was used as
part of the protesting individual's daily life. Both a shopping
center and a cable television system, by contrast, are "not limited to the personal use" of their owners.247 A shopping center
is open to the public to come and go as it pleases. A cable system carries signals from broadcast television stations and may
offer programming from independent pay television networks
241. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980).
242. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943).
243. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
244. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
245. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (citations omitted).
246. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
247. [d. at 87. The Court termed this the "most important" distinguishing factor
between Pruneyard and Wooley, id..
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as welI,248
Second, both Wooley and Barnette involved private affirmation of a governmentally prescribed position or message.249
Neither Pruneyard nor public access cable requirements involve recitation of a state-dictated point of view. 250 There is
thus no danger of "governmental discrimination for or against
a particular message."251
Finally, both the owner of the shopping center and the cable
television operator remain free to "expressly disavow any connection" with the position expressed. 252 The shopping center
owner can post a sign, the cable operator can publish in the
contract with subscribers or any channel guide distributed by
the operator, or can transmit on the access channel itself, a
statement disclaiming sponsorship of the message and explaining that, by state law, the communication is prohibited
from being restricted. 253
A second stricture which cable access rules must not violate
if they are to be constitutionally valid is the "central tenet of
the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.,,254 That principle means that
the government may not "[set] the agenda of public discus248. See text accompanying notes 71-72, 83-87, supra.
249. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 87-88.
250. [d. at 87.
251. [d.
252. [d.
253. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), which struck down a requirement that government employees pay, in their union dues, to support causes with
which they disagreed, was not discussed in Pruneyard. However the crucial distinction between the right of a private individual to remain silent and the rights of a business entity, the use of which are not limited to that of its owners, is not contradicted by
Abood. Additionally, Abood specifically relied on the statement in Barnette, "If there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Abood, 431
U.S. at 235 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642).
Public access requirements, though, do not favor one ideological or philosophical
position over another; they permit all members of a community to speak on all sides of
an issue. Accordingly, cable access rules do not present the danger that a government
official will force citizens or even cable operators, ''to confess by word" faith in an officially prescribed orthodoxy.
254. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 745-46 (plurality opinion). See Wooley,
430 U.S. at 717; Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The
government must step in, however, when there are conflicting demands by competing
speakers for use of the same forum, for the purpose of "protecting individuals or
groups from nongovernmental interference in the exercise of their rights; and in eliminating obstacles to the effective functioning of the system." T. EMERSON, supra note
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sion,"255 and that any government regulation which involves
speech must operate "in a manner consistent with the command of the Equal Protection Clause."256
Requiring the setting aside of one cable channel for public
access on a first-come, first-served basis does not offend this
principle of neutrality. First, access rules do not serve to disseminate a State ideology; there is no concern of government
transmission of objectionable propaganda. 257 Second, the access rules, by their very nature, permit discussion by people
possessing opinions on all sides of an issue.258 Thus, there is
no danger of the government giving "one side of a debatable
public question an advantage in expressing its views to the
people ...."259 And, because users of the public access channel can discuss whatever issue they desire, there is no risk that
government will determine the subjects for permissible
debate. 26o
Cable access requirements also do no violate the equal protection clause. 261 All speakers who so desire are given equal
opportunities to use the cable system.262 Additionally, cable
television operators are not being discriminated against unconstitutionally just because other owners of different media are
not subject to the same requirements: "Each medium of expression. . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes
by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems.,,263
Another fundamental principle of the First Amendment is
that government is prohibited from, "limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw."264 In
219 at 29. See, Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630; Cox v. New Hampshire,
312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941).
255. E.g., Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2922 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
256. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 471.
257. See text accompanying notes 251-252 supra.
258. See text accompanying notes 228-229 supra.
259. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785.
260. "To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate
would be to allow the government control over the search for political truth." Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 538. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 462 n.6; Mosley, 408
U.S. at 95; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concWTing in part).
261. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 461-62; Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96.
262. See text accompanying note 229, supra.
263. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 557. See also cases discussed in note
129, supra.
264. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1963). In Grosjean, the Court struck down a tax on newspapers, "because, in the light
of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated
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Buckley v. Valeo,265 the Supreme Court upheld a limitation on
the amount an individual could contribute to a political campaign but ruled that any government limitation on the amount
that candidates could spend on their own campaigns, or the
amount that private individuals could spend independently
from a campaign, violated the .First Amendment. The Court
ruled that it was improper to attempt to equalize the relative
ability of one group of speakers by limiting the speech of other
speakers: ''The concept that government may restrict the
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment. . . ."266
This prescription, however, does not lead to the invalidation
of cable television access rules. The Buckley decision stated
that such restriction was constitutionally impermissible because the First Amendment was designed to secure the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to. assure unfettered exchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social change desired by the
people.267 In fact, the Court specifically noted that the difference between the campaign expenditure law and the F.C.C.'s
equal time provisions was that the effect of the spending limitation was to supp~ess the amount of speech while the effect of
the fairness doctrine is one of "enhancing the volume and quality of coverage of public issues."268 A public access channel,
like the equal time rule and unlike the limitation on campaign
spending, will increase the stock of information from which a
community may draw and improve the coverage of public issues by permitting speakers from all sides of an issue to present their case.269
Additionally, the speech of a cable television operator is not
limited in the same way as either a candidate or independent
commentator would have been by the restrictions struck down
in Buckley. Those restrictions sharply curtailed the right of an
device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is
entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." [d. at 250.
265. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
266. [d. at 48-49 (emphasis added).
267. [d. at 49. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266 & 269, United
States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20, and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957».
268. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 49 n.55 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393).
269. See text accompanying note 229, supra.
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individual to engage in "vigorous advocacy"270 and the right of
a candidate "to engage in the discussion of public issues and
vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the
election of other candidates."271 To the contrary, cable television operators remain free to discuss any and all issues as vigorously as they wish. 272 While they are losing control of one
channel,273 they retain the power to use the remaining channels to express their positions. 274 And those cable television
operators who do not have any channels remaining for their
own use can continue to communicate their ideas both through
taking their turn on the public access channel and through utilization of any other medium of communication. 275

III
The Constitutional Classification of Public Access
Requirements
That public access requirements for cable television further
fundamental First Amendment goals does not, by itself, establish the constitutionality of those requirements. The nature of
the restriction imposed on the cable television operator must
be classified so that the proper constitutional test may be applied. There are a variety of ways by which access requirements arguably can be classified. Each of these would lead to
the conclusion that imposition of access requirements would
not infringe unconstitutionally on a cable operator's First
Amendment rights.
270. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 48 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. at 269).
271. Id. at 52.
272. See Metromedia, Inc., - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2921 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
("These same messages can reach an equally large audience through a variety of other
media: newspapers, television, radio, magazines, direct mail, pamphlets, etc. . . . It
borders on the frivolous to suggest that the [ban on billboard advertising) infringes on
freedom of expression, given the wide range of alternative means available.").
273. In some instances, in fact, that channel will be unused. See Kreiss, Deregula·
tion of Cable Television and the Problem of Access Under the First Amendment, 54 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1033-39 (1981).
274. See text accompanying notes 79-82, supra.
275. Even if it were slightly more convenient for a cable operator to express his
views in the absence of an access requirement, that ease would only be the result of
monopoly control of a means of communication otherwise closed to all. Cj. Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 389 ("[T)he licensee has no constitutional right to ... monopolize a radio
frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens.").
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A. Local Regulation of a Community's Streets

Because cable television systems must use municipal rightsof-way to construct their distribution systems, the state and
the locality can require the operator to obtain a franchise from
the locality before beginning construction of the system. 276
The use of the public streets traditionally gives the local government the power and authority to regulate a business using
those streets. 277 The general principle is that ''reasonable conditions can be attached to a grant for the use of streets."278
Cable television companies in many states thus are subject
to numerous restrictions. The rates they can charge subscribers are regulated and limited.279 They can neither curtail service nor transfer ownership of their business without official
approvaJ.280 They must supply safe and adequate service and
they must wire every part of their franchise area, even in those
areas where it will be uneconomical to do SO.281
Public access requirements constitute a similar ''reasonable''
condition that can be imposed in exchange for a cable company's right to use the public ways. They serve valid state interests in permitting members of the community to utilize this
limited means of communication and in increasing the presen276. See Boulder I, 630 F.2d at 707. See generally W. BAER, supra note 19, at 4; Rice,
The Communications Pipeline, PuBLIC MANAGEMENT, June 1980, at 2-4. While one
court has stated that cable is not sufficiently affected with a public interest to pennit
regulation on that basis, Greater Fremont, bic., 302 F. Supp. at 665 (''The public has
about as much real need for the services of a CATV system as it does for hand carved
ivory back-scratchers."), it is generally acknowledged that cable systems, by providing
access to a complete offering of diverse television communications, are affected with
an important public interest. See, e.g., Connecticut Television v. Public Utilities Commission, 159 Conn. 317, 296 A.2d 276 (1970); Borough of Scottdale v. National Cable Television Corp., 381 A.2d 859 (1977); R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION 91 (1972). This has also
been the specific detennination of several states as the basis for their regulation of
cable television; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2006 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.01
(West Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 711.080 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:5A-2(a) (West
Supp. 1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAws § 811 (McKenney Supp. 1981).
277. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2006 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.01 (West
Supp. 1981); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 811 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
278. Borough oj Scottdale, 381 A.2d at 862. See Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Sedalia,
518 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Mo. 1974). This type of regulation is also within the state's inherent
police power, see text accompanying notes 442-444, in:fra.
279. See, e.g.• CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-333d (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. § 12-2008 (Supp.
1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:5A-11, 48:5A-28 (West Supp. 1981).
280. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.05 (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:5A37,48:5A-43 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 826,827 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
281. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 166A §§ 5(n), 8 (West 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 48:5A-36, 48:5A-39 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 824 (McKinney Supp. 1981).
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tation of local issues and opinions on the local media. 282
Although some expense may be necessary for a cable television company to comply with a public access requirement, this
would not invalidate the regulation.283 The Supreme Court has
held that "[ a] reasonable fixing of the amount of the fee"
charged by a locality for use of its public streets is valid. 284 The
Court similarly has upheld the imposition of a fee for use of a
privately owned mailbox.285 The Court stated that the requirement that postage must be paid on all letters placed in a
mailbox was not unconstitutional even though it was the recipient of the letters who paid for the ''physical components" of
the mailbox.286 Justice White, in his concurring opinion, stated
that the governmental interest in defraying operating expenses and minimizing the stuffing of a mailbox with unstamped material was sufficient to justify the fee, even if it
"will totally prevent the putative user from communicating
with his intended correspondents."287
The requirement that a cable television company set aside a
channel for public access programming and help establish a
studio for such programming can be viewed as a ''reasonable
fee" imposed on the cable company in exchange for the company's access to the locality's streets. Even if cable operators
were to be restricted somewhat in their ability to exhibit their
own programming on the cable system, such a rule would still
282. See text accompanying notes 228-229 and 232, supra.
283. Equipment for a small black and white production unit can cost as little as
$30,000. BROADCAST/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981). See Midwest 1,406 U.S. at 671 (plu·
rality opinion); USES OF CABLE, supra note 80, at 23.
284. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941). The Court held that a law
requiring a license fee for parades or precessions, "not a revenue tax, but one to meet
the expense incident to the administration of the [law) and to the maintenance of pub·
lic order in the matter licensed," was permissible. Id. A public access requirement for
cable television, likewise, is not promulgated to raise revenue but to ensure that the
private business which has obtained either the exclusive right, or one of a limited
number of rights·of.way, to the public streets is operated in the public interest.
285. Council o/Greenburgh Civil Associations, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981).
286. Id. at 2684. Just as a mailbox which is constructed or purchased by a private
individual becomes an, "essential part of the . . . nationwide system for tile delivery
and receipt of mail" and thus subject to the Postal Service's regulations, id., the pri·
vately constructed cable system, which uses the public streets in laying down the dis·
tribution network, and the public airwaves as the "backbone" of its program offering,
becomes an essential part of the local electronic communications service, and accord·
ingly is subject to reasonable regulation, see text accompanying notes 199-201 and 277279,supra.
287. 101 S. Ct. at 2691.
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be valid as a reasonable obligation imposed on those who use
the public ways.
B. Regulation of a Scarce Electronic Communications Medium

The regulation of radio and television by the federal government has been held to be constitutional by the Supreme Court
because the "broadcast spectrum simply is not large enough to
accommodate everybody."288 Because of the problems of interference between broadcast signals, only a limited number of
frequencies can be used. The number of persons who want to
broadcast far exceeds that limited number. 289
However, the government is not restricted in its power to
regulate broadcast frequencies solely to ''traffic control."290
Not only may Congress prevent interference between broadcast stations, it is permitted to regulate the broadcast media
"in the public interest."291 This broad authority for governmental regulation is due to the scarcity of the broadcast frequencies, the necessity for government to allocate those
frequencies, and "the legitimate claims of those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to those frequencies for expression of their views."292
The power of government to require, consistent with the
First Amendment, broadcasters to permit others to use their
frequencies was delineated by the Supreme Court in three
cases, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,293 CBS v. Democratic
National Committee,294 and CBS v. FCC.295 In Red Lion, the
Court upheld two requirements of the fairness doctrine. The
first was that whenever a broadcaster endorses a political candidate, the opposing candidates must be offered time to reply
288. NBC, 319 U.S. at 213. See also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396-401. Other reasons that
have been given for regulating radio and television include: "their uniquely pervasive
presence in the lives of all Americans," FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748; the
fact that broadcasting is "uniquely accessible to children," id. at 744; and that broadcast listeners and viewers are a "captive audience," that is they may only avoid
messages by performing some affirmative physical act, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 127, Banzhq/, 405 F.2d at 1100. It is noteworthy that all of
these concerns, even the "unique" factors, apply to cable television as well as
broadcasting.
289. National Citizens Committee/or Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 799.
290. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 395; NBC, 319 U.S. at 217-18.
291. National Citizens Committee/or Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 795.
292. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01.
293. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
294. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
295. 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981).
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either personally or through a representative.296 The second
requirement was that whenever a personal attack is made on
an individual involved in a public issue, that individual must
be offered an opportunity to respond personally.297 The Court
stated that because only a tiny fraction of those with the resources and know-how could hope to communicate through
broadcast frequencies,298 "the Government is permitted to put
restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should
be expressed on this unique medium."299
The Court outlined some characteristics of the broadcast medium which distinguish it from the print medium. For example, licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of broadcast
frequencies, only the temporary privilege of using those frequencies. 30o But the most important distinction is that because
there are "substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish."301 Accordingly, the Court held, "[t]here is no sanctuary
in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.,,302
The Court said that in evaluating the constitutionality of the
fairness doctrine, "[ i] t is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.,,303 And
the public's right includes the right "to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences."304
To further this public right, the Court said, conflicting views
and opinions must be aired. The Court noted the informational
value in permitting those who disagree with the broadcaster to
state their own position rather than be forced to rely on the
296. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 374-75. This rule is now located at 47 C.F.R. 73.1930
(1980).
297. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 373-74. The CUlTent rule is located at 47 C.F.R. 73.1920
(1980).
298. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387-88.
299. Id. at 390.
300. Id. at 394 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307(d».
301. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388.
302. Id. at 392. The Court also quoted its statement in Associated Press, 326 U.S. at
20, "Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment
does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests." 395 U.S. at 392.
303. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
304. Id. at 390.
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same broadcaster's restatement and interpretation of their
views:
The expression of views opposing those which broadcasters
permit to be aired in the first place need not be confined solely
to the broadcasters themselves as proxies. "Nor is it enough
that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own
teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by
what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice
to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own
mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually
believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very
utmost for them.,,305

In CBS v. Democratic National Committee, the Court rejected an argument that the policy of a television station to refuse to sell time for any political or editorial advertising
violated the First Amendment. First, the Court said, the Federal Communications Commission was not required to order
stations to sell advertising time because "the public interest in
providing access to the marketplace of 'ideas and experiences'
would scarcely be served by a system so heavily weighted in
favor of the financially affluent, or those with access to
wealth.,,306 Even if the fairness doctrine were applied to political advertisements so as to require stations to make equal
time available free-of-charge for those who disagree with the
paid political advertisements, the Court stated that the
wealthy would still be able to determine the issues to be
discussed. 307
The second problem the Court foresaw was that Federal
Communications Commission regulation of political advertising would create a risk of enlargement of governmental control
of debate of public issues on the airwaves. 308 The Court said
that "[t]he Commission's responsibilities under a right-of-access system would tend to draw it into a continuing case-by305. Id. at 392 n.1B (quoting, J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 32 (R. McCallum ed. 1947». The
Court stated:
[lIt is not unreasonable for the FCC to conclude that the objective of adequate
presentation of all sides may best be served by allowing those most closely
affected to make the response, rather than leaving the response in the hands
of the station which has attacked their candidacies, endorsed their opponents,
or carried a personal attack upon them.
Id. at 379.
306. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 123.
307. Id.
30B. Id. at 126.
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case determination of who should be heard and when."309
The Court distinguished this case from those which prohibited the government from banning some protected speech from
a public area while permitting other speech in the same
area.3lO The Court said that those cases were inapplicable to a
case concerning a private right of access to the broadcast media because:
In none of those cases did the forum sought for expression have
an affirmative and independent statutory obligation to provide
full and fair coverage of public issues, such as Congress has
imposed on all broadcast licensees. In short, there is no "discrimination" against controversial speech present in this case.
The question here is not whether there is to be discussion of
controversial issues of public importance on the broadcast media, but rather who shall determine what issues are to be discussed by whom, and when.3ll

The Supreme Court did uphold a right of access to the broadcast media in CBS v. FCC. The Court ruled that a Federal
Communications Commission requirement that broadcast stations make time available for sale, upon request, to legally
qualified candidates for federal elective office3l2 was constitutional. While acknowledging that it "has never approved a general right of access to the media," the Court stated that this
case only involved "a limited right to 'reasonable' access that
pertains only to legally qualified federal candidates and may
be invoked by them only for the purpose of advancing their
candidacies once a campaign has commenced. "313
Justice White, in his dissent, argued that this right of access
encroached upon the discretion of the broadcaster: "Instead of
adhering to this traditional approach, the Court has laid the
foundation for the unilateral right of candidates to demand and
receive a 'reasonable' amount of time a candidate determines
to be necessary to execute a particular campaign strategy."314
The Court ruled that regardless of such assertions, ''the statutory right of access . . . properly balances the First Amend309. ld. at 127.
310. E.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
311. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 129-30 (emphasis
added).
312. This requirement enforced the statutory mandate of 47U.S.C. § 312(a) (7)
(1981).
313. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
314. ld. at 2839.
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ment rights of federal candidates, the public, and
broadcasters."315
Cable television, like radio or television, is a scarce communications resource. 316 The physical limitation of pole space,317
the reasonable desire of a city or town to limit the number of
times its public streets are torn up in order to lay down a
cable,318 the public policy reasons for granting an exclusive
franchise,319 and the unique economic characteristics of the
cable television industry320 serve to limit the number of persons who can operate a cable television system in any community. As is true of the broadcast media, "all who possess the
financial resources and the desire to communicate" by cable
television "cannot be satisfactorily accommodated."321
If the federal government is permitted to regulate the scarce
broadcast frequencies to assure diversity of opinion, then the
state government should be permitted to regulate the inherently and inevitably limited cable television medium to ''preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."322 A public access
requirement serves just such a purpose.
The argument that regulation of cable television as a
"scarce" resource is impermissible because there can be more
than one cable television system in a locality323 must fail. Regulation of broadcast television due to its scarcity is still constitutional even though in most areas of the country there is more
than one television station which can be received.324 In those
localities there is no "monopoly" control of the airwaves, since,
as Professor Posner has pointed out, "different frequencies
315. Id. at 2830.
316. E.g., Boulder II, 7 Media L. Rptr. at 1999. The court of appeals held that government was permitted to deal with the effects of cable television's "medium scarcity."
Id.
317. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
318. See note 184 supra.
319. The reasons include ease of regulation, e.g., Multiple Queens Cable Licenses
Urged, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1980, at C18, col. 4, and the encouragement to wire unprofitable areas, see text accompanying notes 282, supra.
320. See text accompanying notes 50-70, supra.
321. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 101. See text accompanying note 406, infra.
322. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390.
323. See Posner, supra note 212, at Ill.
324. 99.8% of television households can receive at least two over-the-air stations,
90.26% can receive at least four stations. Office of Plans and Policy, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Policy on Cable Ownership 22 (1981).
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are, within a range, perfect substitutes for one another."325
Thus, it is not a monopolistic characteristic of the broadcast
media which permits government regulation, but an "oligolopolistic" nature. The same should hold true for cable
television. 326
Similarly, although the scarcity of cable television systems
in a given area may be due, in large part, to governmental policy,327 this does not defeat the right of local government to regulate cable television in the public interest. Much of the
scarcity of television broadcast frequencies is due to a decision
by the Federal Communications Commission to encourage the
concept that localities should have at least one "local" television station whenever possible. 328 This local-station concept
permitted the operation of fewer television stations than physically possible because of the need to avoid interference with all
the local signals. 329 Again to quote Professor Posner: "The
scarcity of television channels differs from the scarcity of other
natural resources only in the fact that it is to a significant extent the product of deliberate governmental policies."33o
Another similan.ty between cable television and the broadcast media is that control of cable television systems, radio stations, and broadcast television channels is of a transitive
nature. With both cable and broadcast television, as well as
radio, although one can own the physical equipment necessary
for communication (studios, antennae, or distribution systems) one does not "own" the right to communicate. 331 Television and radio broadcast licenses are limited to three years'
duration and need not be renewed. 332 Similarly, cable television franchises typically are limited to ten or 15 years. 333 At
325. R. POSNER, supra note 52, at 313.
326. See text accompanying notes 52-70, supra.
327. E.g., Posner, supra note 212, at 111.
328. E.g., In the Matter of Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commission's Rules
and Regulations (Sixth Report and Order), 41 F.C.C. 148, 171-72 (1952). See generally
Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Networks: The
Federal Communications Commission's Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L.
REV. 880 (1981).
329. Posner, supra note 212, at 125 & n.54. See also Schuessler, supra note 329, at
988-91.
330. R. POSNER, supra note 52, at 313.
331. See also Associates and Aldrich Co., 440 F.2d at 136 ("Unlike broadcasting, the
publication of a newspaper is not a government conferred privilege.").
'332. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1981).
333. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 26 § 604 (1980); HAw. REV. STAT. § 44OG-10 (Supp. 1979);
KAN. STAT. § 12-2007 (Supp. 1975).
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the end of that period, the municipality is free to decide not to
renew the franchise agreement and to select another cable
company.334 Additionally, broadcast licenses and many cable
franchises can be revoked during the license or franchise period due to serious misconduct or failure to abide by the terms
of the licensing or franchise agreements. 335
There is one distinction between cable television and the
broadcast media which would, in fact, seem to indicate a
greater likelihood that an access requirement for cable television be held to be constitutional than would a similar requirement for the broadcast media. Broadcast television and radio
licensees have an affirmative duty to present "full and fair coverage of important public issues."336 The obligation imposed
by the federal government on cable television operators, in
contrast, is much less rigid: if, and only if, they produce programs, operators must "afford reasonable opportunity for discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."337
Not only does this duty not call for "full and fair coverage," it
applies solely to programming produced by the cable operator.
It does not apply to programming on channels leased to third
parties by the operator,338 even though it is the operator, in
most cases, who has selected the lease channel program producer. 339 Additionally, there is no obligation for the operators
who do not produce their own programming either to cover
334. See generally The New Era: Rejranchising Comes of Age, CABLEVISION, Dec. 7,
1981, at 115-57.
335. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1981) with DEL. CODE tit. 26, § 606 (Supp. 1980);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 711, 130 (1979) and R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-19-8 (1981).
336. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 129.
337. 47 C.F.R. 76.209 (1980). See generally Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable TV.'
Fostering Debate in a Cohesive Audience, 61 VA. L. REV. 515 (1975). The enforcement
of this duty by the Federal Communications Commission is much weaker, as well. Unlike broadcasters whose licenses must be renewed every three years by the Commission every three years, and who must prove each time that their obligations have been
fulfilled, cable operators are franchised by the state or locality, see text accompanying
notes 193 and 333, supra. The only policying authority the Commission has is the
power to revoke the registration statement the operator has rued with the Commission.
47 C.F.R. §§ 76.9, 76.12 (1980). In the research for this article, not a single case of the
Commission revoking a cable operator's registration statement (or the statement's
predecessor, the certificate of compliance) for non-compliance with this obligation was
discovered.
338. See text accompanying notes 83-87, supra.
339. The exceptions being those instances where the franchise agreement itself requires that channels be made available to specific programmers, as was done in Pittsburgh where one channel was set aside for programming by the Christian Associates
of Western Pennsylvania. Panero, supra note 78, at 332.
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fairly, or to cover at all, important local issues. Thus, while
there may not be "discrimination" against controversial speech
if broadcast licensees are permitted journalistic discretion in
determining the manner for discussion of public issues,340
without statutory or regulatory safeguards there would be a
grave question of "whether there is to be discussion of controversial issues of public importance,,341 on cable television.342
A public access cable television requirement can encourage
such discussion far more effectively than the fairness doctrine.
The public access channel operates as an open forum; it is not
triggered by speech presented by the cable television operator.343 Thus, the access channel does not discourage the cable
operator from exhibiting controversial programming.
But the fairness doctrine, because it only requires that free
time be supplied in response to the broadcast of a controversial position, provides a powerful incentive for timidity and
avoidance of controversy.344 This, in effect, leads to a "self-cen340. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 130.
341. [d.
342. Another similarity between broadcast and cable television is that, rather than
being parcelled out to a limited number of licensees and franchisees, both media could
have been made available to the general public as common carriers. In Red Lion, the
Court said that Congress, to protect the public· interest in receiving information and
opinions from diverse sources, could have devised a system other than the present
licensing scheme:
Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of
licensees, in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government could surely have de·
creed that each frequency should be shared among all or some of those who
wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast day or the broad·
cast week.
395 U.S. at 390-91. Similarly, ownership of the cable distribution system could have
been separated entirely from the selection of the programming to be carried by that
system:
The only way to avoid the broadcast regulatory model and allow cable to develop as a. medium of communications open and available in a manner similar
to the print or film media is to preclude the vertical integration of the programming and distribution functions in cable. In this way, the cable operator's distribution monopoly would not produce any concentration of power over free
expression in the use of cable channels and would offer no pretext for Government control of programming or other information distributed by cable.
Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 25. See also R. SMITH, supra note 277, at 89-92.
343. See text accompanying note 88, supra.
344. E.g., SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50, at 93-94. The Court in Red Lion, while
upholding the fairness doctrine acknowledged the possibility of this danger:
It is strenuously argued, however, that if political editorials or personal attacks
will trigger an obligation in broadcasters to afford the opportunity for expression to speakers who need not pay for time and whose views are unpalatable
to the licensees, then broadcasters will be irresistibly forced to self-censorship
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sorship"345 by broadcasters which thereby "dampens the vigor
and limits the variety of public debate."346 The advantage of a
public access requirement is that it assures, rather than discourages, the presentation of, and full debate on, the important
controversial issues of the day.
A public access requirement for cable television is not subject to the same criticism as the proposal that broadcasters be
required to accept editorial advertising. While that proposal
only opened the broadcast media to the "financially affluent or
those with access to wealth,"347 a cable access channel permits
all to present their views. 348 The wealthy would not be able to
either monopolize the channel or dictate the issues to be
discussed.
A second constitutional infirmity of the editorial advertising
proposal, enlarged government involvement in determining
the content of public debate, also does not apply to a cable access requirement. Under a right-to-purchase-advertising rule,
the Federal Communications Commission would have been required "to oversee far more of the day-to-day operations of
broadcasters' conduct, deciding such questions as whether a
particular individual or group has had sufficient opportunity to
present its viewpoint and whether a particular viewpoint has
already been sufficiently aired."349 The cable access rule would
only require "content-neutral" government supervision, to assure that the cable company operates its public access channel
on a nondiscriminatory basis.350 The government, accordingly,
would not be involved in the substance of the "editorial
and their coverage of controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least
rendered wholly ineffective. Such a result would indeed be a serious matter,
for should licensees actually eliminate their coverage of controversial issues,
the purpose of the doctrine would be stifled.
At this point, however, as the Federal Communications Commission has indicated, that possibility is at best speculative.
395 U.S. at 392-93.
345. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
346. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
279). See R. POSNER, supra note 52, at 313 ("But the fairness doctrine is not calculated
to increase the broadcaster's output of ideas. On the contrary, it penalizes him for
presenting controversial ideas by requiring him to present all sides of a controversy.").
See also Bazelon, supra note 89, at 205-06.
347. CBS, Inc. Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 123.
348. See text accompanying notes 88-89, supra.
349. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 124-26.
350. See text accompanying note 88, supra.
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process."351
A cable access rule would, without causing the problems
warned of in CBS v. Democratic National Committee, serve the
same purposes as the rules upheld in Red Lion and CBS v.
FCC. As the fairness doctrine requires a licensee to share in
the frequency with non-licensees,352 an access rule would require a franchised cable company to share one channel with
those without such a franchise. Each duty would lead to the
presentation of "those views and voices which are representative of the community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves"353 or the cable system.
The Supreme Court, in CBS v. FCC, recognized three separate sectors of the population with First Amendment interests:
broadcasters, federal candidates, and the viewers and listeners.354 The Court said that requiring broadcasters to sell advertising time to candidates, made a "significant contribution to
freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates
to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for
the effective operation of the democratic process.,,355 While
this decision only granted a "limited" right of access for federal
candidates to the broadcast media,356 the reasoning used by
the Court could support a requirement of an access channel for
cable television. The First Amendment protection of freedom
of expression is not limited to a discussion of the merits of various candidates: "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its
historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period."357 Even in CBS v. FCC, the Court acknowledged,
"speech concerning public affairs is. . . the essence of self-government."358 Thus a cable access rule would significantly contribute to freedom of expression by improving the ability of a
wide range of speakers to present, and viewers to receive, im351. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 124-26.
352. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389.
353. [d.
354. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
355. [d.
356. [d.
357. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02
(1940) ).
358. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
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portant, relevant information. 359 Just as the Commission's rule
did not "impair the discretion· of broadcasters to present their
views on any issue or to carry any particular type of programming,"360 a cable access rule would permit cable operators to
continue to present their views and choice of programming on
the remaining channels.361 As the Commission's rule ''properly balances the first amendment rights of federal candidates,
the public, and broadcasters,"362 a cable access rule, setting
aside one channel for use on a first-come, first-served basis,
properly balances the First Amendment rights of those in the
community who wish to express their views via the cable system, the members of the community who receive information
through the cable system, and the cable television operators.
C. Time, Place, and Manner Regulation

A local requirement that cable television operators set aside
one channel for public access programming can also be viewed
as a reasonable ''time, place, and manner" regulation. 363 Specifically, an access requirement would be a restriction on the
place and manner of a cable operator's communication. Time,
place, and manner restrictions are constitutionally valid if they
can be justified without reference to the restricted speech!s
content, serve a significant. governmental interest, and leave
ample alternative channels for communication. 364
The "constitutional touchstone" of ''time, place, and manner"
regulation is that it be based on neither the content nor subject
matter of the regulated speech.365 The Supreme Court held
that a rule forbidding a public utility from including in its
monthly billing envelope inserts discussing issues of public
policy, while permitting inserts discussing noncontroversial
matters, was not a time, place, or manner regulation because it
was not "content-neutral."366
A regulation that restricted the distribution and sale of religious material at a state fair to assigned booths, however, was
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
U.S. at
365.
366.

See text accompanying notes 228-229, supra.
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
See text accompanying notes 274-276, supra.
CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 85-86.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; Consolidated Edison Co., 447
535-36.
Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 364 n.6 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 537.
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upheld as a valid time, place, and manner restriction in Heffron
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 367 The
Court said that this rule was unrelated to the content or subject matter of the restricted speech since it "applies evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or
to solicit funds. No person or organization, whether commercial or charitable, is permitted to engage in such activities except from a booth rented for those purposes. "368
A cable access rule is similarly content-neutral. It is unrelated to either the content or subject matter of the cable television operator's speech.369 It applies evenhandedly to all with a
cable franchise and is not based on governmental disapproval
of the cable operator's views.37o
A second requirement for time, place, and manner restrictions is that they further a "significant governmental interest."371 Governmental interests which have been held to be
significant include maintaining the orderly movement of a
crowd at a state fair,372 regulating traffic,373 ensuring that simultaneous parades do not prevent all speakers from being
heard,374 and improving the aesthetic quality of a municipality.375 A public access channel furthers many substantial governmental interests including: increasing the diversity of
speakers and topics presented through the cable system;376 enhancing the individual's interest in self-expression377 and the
subscriber's interest in receiving a broad range of programming and options;378 and protecting the peace within a community by permitting the free and open exchange of ideas. 379
The third criterion for time, place, and manner regulation is
that there remain adequate alternate channels of communication. 380 The Court struck down a prohibition of the use of "For
367. 101 s. ct. 2559 (1981).
368. Id. at 2564.
369. See text accompanying notes 344-346, supra.
370. See text accompanying notes 258-261, supra.
371. See Hejfron, 101 S. Ct. at 2565; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771.
372. Hejfron, 101 S. Ct. at 2565.
373. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941).
374. Id. at 576.
375. Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2892 (plurality opinion).
376. See text accompanying notes 228-229, supra.
377. See text accompanying note 232, supra.
378. See text accompanying note 235, supra.
379. See text accompanying notes 239-41, supra.
380. See Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2896-97 (plurality opinion); Linmark Associ·
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Sale" signs on the lawns in front of houses because the options
left for the sellers, newspaper advertising and listing with real
estate brokers, were more expensive and less effective than the
signs. 381 The Court concluded that the aforementioned alternatives were "far from satisfactory."382 In a more recent case,
newspaper, radio, and television advertising was determined to
be an unsatisfactory substitute for billboard advertising because those alternatives were "insufficient, inappropriate, and
prohibitively expensive."383
In Heffron, the Supreme Court found that restricting the distribution of leaflets at a state fair to an assigned booth left adequate forums for distribution of the material. First, the Court
pointed out that leaflets could be distributed anywhere outside
the fairgrounds. 384 Second, and "more importantly" the Court
said that this rule "has not been shown to deny access within
the forum in question.,,385 The Court held that, for purposes of
constitutional analysis, the fairgrounds should not be separated into two sections, open areas and booths. Instead, because the booths were located within a major section of the fair
and not "secreted away in some nonaccessible location," the
relevant forum was the entire fairground. 386
Even if one channel is dedicated to use by the public, the
cable television operator will have adequate alternate means
for communicating desired information. First, the cable operators are free to utilize both their turn on the access channel
and any or all of the existing alternative media to display their
ates, Inc., 431 U.S. at 93; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771. If a regulation is
content-based, it cannot be justified by the fact that there may be alternate means of
communication available. Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 541 n.l0; Va. State Bd.
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757 n.15; Southeastern Promotions Ltd., 420 U.S. at 556; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S: 147, 163 (1939). But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S.
50, 62 (1976) (upholding a requirement that adult movie theaters not be located near
each other because, "the market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained."). Because a public access requirement is not based on the cable operator's speech, see
notes 344-346, supra, and accompanying text, it would not be a content-based regulation; accordingly, the availability of alternate means of communication for the cable
operator is relevant.
381. Linmark Associates, Inc., 431 U.S. at 93.
382. Id.
383. Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2897 (plurality opinion) (quoting a stipulation of
both parties, Joint Stipulation No. 28.).
384. He.tfron, 101 S. Ct. at 2567.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 2568 n.16.
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messages. 387 Second, many cable operators have several channels available for programming; even if one channel is reserved
for public access, the cable operator may communicate
through the remaining channels.388 As the Heffron decision
makes clear, the relevant forum for constitutional analysis is
not the individual access channel by itself but the full panoply
of channels which are available to the cable operator. 389 Thus,
if the cable operator can communicate on any channel, there
remains an adequate alternate channel for the operator's
communication.
With cable access requirements, as with time, place, and
manner regulations which have been upheld by the Supreme
Court, "the net effect of the regulation on free expression
would not be adverse.,,39o The Court has delineated the difference between regulations which limit the "manner" of communication and those which impose "direct quantity restrictions"
on the amount of permissible communications: 391 "The First
Amendment protects the right of every citizen to 'reach the
minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.' "392 A rule establishing a cable access channel would facilitate, rather than inhibit, the exchange
of information, ideas, and impressions. The total amount of
communication permitted the cable operator is not limited. 393
In Red Lion, the Court analogized the fairness doctrine to
traditional time, place, and manner regulations:
Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying
equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized private speech, so may the Government limit the use of broadcast
equipment. The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user
of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a
right to snuff out the free speech of others.394

Similarly, the government may limit the use of cable equipment by establishing a public access channel. The right of free
speech of a cable operator does not extend to a right to "snuff
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

See text accompanying note 276, supra.
See text accompanying notes 274-275, supra.
See text accompanying notes 387-388, supra.
Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2913 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18 & n.17 (emphasis omitted).
HeJfron, 101 S. Ct. at 2567-68 (quoting Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87).
See text accompanying notes 274-276, supra.
3905 U.S. at 387.
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out the free speech of others,"395 and the preservation of one
channel for public use is a valid governmental regulation to
protect the right of free speech of all members of the
community.
D.

Promoting Diversity: The FCC versus the N.C.C.B. Model

In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting ,396
the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of regulations designed to encourage diversity in mass communications.
The rules prohibited cross-ownership of newspapers and
either radio or television stations in the same community.397
The goal of these regulations was to diversify ownership of
these means of communications to "enhance the possibility of
achieving greater diversity of viewpoints."398 The Court upheld the rule, stating that "given the absence of persuasive
countervailing considerations, 'even a small gain in diversity'
was 'worth pursuing.' "399 The standard the Court utilized in
determining the constitutionality of the rules is particularly
noteworthy, as it indicates the Court's recognition of the importance of encouraging the presentation of a diversity of viewpoints: "The regulations are a reasonable means of promoting
the public interest in diversified mass communications; thus
they do not violate the First Amendment rights of those who
will be denied broadcast licenses pursuant to them."40o
A cable television access requirement is also a ''reasonable
means" for promoting "diversified mass communications."
The establishment of a channel for all members of a community to state their opinions would undoubtedly lead to the presentation of a greater diversity of viewpoints than would
otherwise be available. 401 Not only would there be more voices
under an access requirement, these additional voices would be
local voices, expressing local viewpoints and raising local con395. [d. See note 255, supra.
396. 436 U.S. 775 (1978).
397. [d. at 785 n.8 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1976». The rules permitted most instances of then-existing cross-ownership to continue. 436 U.S. at 779.
398. 436 U.S. at 796.
399. [d. at 786 (quoting Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and
Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1076, 1080
n.30 (1975».
400. National Citizens Committee jor Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 802 (emphasis
added).
401. See text accompanying notes 228-229, supra.
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cerns. 402 As the Court pointed out, it is in the public interest to
encourage programming for a community by those who reside
in the community.403
Because the N.C.C.B. ruling concerned the broadcast media,
it is unclear whether the same ''reasonable means" test would
be applied to cable television. One indication that the standard would be applied to cable arises froin the Court's further
explanation of the applicability of the reasonableness test, to
the F.C.C.'s rules: "Being forced to 'choose among applicants
for the same facilities,' the Commission has chosen on a 'sensible basis,' one designed to further, rather than contravene, 'the
system of freedom of expression.' "404 As a community must
also select its cable television company from among several
competing applicants,405 it should be permitted to establish
"sensible" ground rules for promoting freedom of expression
on the cable system.406
402. See text accompanying note 235, supra.
403. National Citizens Committee jor Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 804, 808.
404. Id. at 802 (quoting, T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 663
(1970».
405. For example, there were nine applicants for the New Orleans franchise, seven
for Fort Worth, Panero, supra note 78, at 306-10.
406. The Court in National Citizens Committeejor Broadcasting rejected two arguments in opposition to the rules as inapplicable to a proposal to limit cross-ownership.
The Court's analysis indicates that similar arguments also would not be relevant to
cable access rules.
The first claim was that the FCC rules unconstitutionally conditioned a benefit
(ownership of a broadcast station) on forfeiture of a constitutional right (ownership of
a newspaper). The Court distinguished Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) and
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), which voided the denial of public benefits due to
refusal to take a loyalty oath and affiliation with a particular political organization,
respectively, because the denial of benefits in those cases was based on the content of
constitutionally protected speech and therefore had the effect of abridging freedom of
expression. The Court said that the FCC rules, in contrast, "are not content related;
moreover, their purpose and effect is to promote free speech, not to restrict it." 436
U.S. at 801.
Similarly, cable access rules are not content-related and serve to promote freedom of
expression. Thus any claim that a locality is unconstitutionally conditioning the benefit of a cable franchise on the forfeiture of the cable operator's right to speak on, and
control, the access channel, see Ross, supra note 12, at 156, must be dismissed.
A second argument the Court in National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting rejected was that the FCC had unfairly "singled out" newspaper owners in a fashion
similar to the law struck down in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936),
which imposed a tax only on newspapers. One of the controlling distinctions between
the FCC rules and the tax, was that the tax had the effect of limiting the circulation of
information, "an effect inconsistent with the protection conferred Qn the press by the
First Amendment," 436 U.S. at 801. Conversely, the FCC rules were designed, ''to en-
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An Incidental Restriction on First Amendment Rights

Even if it is assumed that cable television operators have a
First Amendment right to control the programming on all of a
system's channels and that access requirements limit their
ability to exercise that right, and it is further assumed that
none of the earlier discussed classifications apply to cable access rules, such requirements would not automatically be
invalid.
First Amendment rights are not absolute. 407 The right of free
speech has never been held to include a right for people to
present their opinions ''whenever and however and wherever
they please."408 The First Amendment "does not forbid the
abridging of speech. But, at the same time, it does forbid the
abridging of the freedom of speech. ,,409
The Supreme Court has recognized the significance of the
difference between regulation designed to abridge freedom of
expression410 and regulation which imposes "incidental restrictions on First Amendment liberties by governmental action in
furtherance of legitimate and substantial state interest other
than suppression of expression."411 Governinental action of
hance the diversity of information hearing by the public...." [d. at 801 (quoting the
lower court decision, 555 F.2d 938, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1977».
An argument that access rules unfairly single out cable operators, see Midwest 11,571
F.2d at 1055, would likewise be rejected because the rules also increase the diversity of
information available to the public, see text accompanying notes 228·235, supra, and
are thus consistent with First Amendment goals. Additionally, because of the unique
characteristics of cable television, both its intimate relationship with the community
and its ability to offer a great number of channels, see text accompanying notes 78 and
193-198, supra, it is reasonable for a locality to impose access requirements solely on
cable television operators.
407. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1930). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 570.
.
408. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at
554.
409. A. MEIKEWOHN, supra note 218, at 19. See also Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San
Diego, 101 S. Ct. at 2920 ("But to say the ordinance presents a First Amendment issue
is not necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment violation." (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original»; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972)
("Recognition that First Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositive
of our inquiry here.").
410. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. at 535;
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85.
411. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1974). See also A. MEIKLEJOHN,
supra note 218, at 16-17 ("[LJet it be noted that ... Congress is not debarred from all
action upon freedom of speech. Legislation which abridges that freedom is forbidden,
but not legislation to enlarge and enrich it.").
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the first kind is held to the strictest scrutiny.412 The latter form
of regulation is constitutionally permissible if it meets a twopart test: first, it must further an important governmental interest unrelated to suppression of freedom of speech and, second, the limitation on First Amendment rights must be no
greater than is necessary to further that interest.413
In United States v. Q'Brien,414 the CoUrt upheld a federal
statute prohibiting the destruction of Selective Service registration certificates. The Court cited a number of substantial
governmental interests in ensuring the continuing availability
of draft cards which were unrelated to the communicative impact of the destruction of the cards,415 and found that the statute was an "appropriately narrow" means to further those
interests.416
Cable access requirements also serve substantial and important governmental interests which are unrelated to the suppression of freedom of expression: encouraging discussion of
public issues by all members of a community,417 increasing the
amount and variety of information on local issues available
through the cable system,418 and maintaining order in the community by permitting all members of the community to voice
their concerns effectively, and feel, accordingly, that they have
412. If a statute's purpose is the ''prohibition of the 'exposition of ideas,' " the state
must show both a compelling subordinate interest and that the state used means narrowly drawn to avoid necessary abridgement of speech. Bellotti v. First Nat'l Bank of
Boston, 435 U.S. at 786. See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. at 540; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25. Cable access rules would not be
subject to this test because their purpose is to enhance the extent and quality of public
discussion, not to suppress speech, see text accompanying notes 268-276, supra. A
cable access rule also does need to overcome the "special protection" which has been
established against prior restraints, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 556.
See Near v. Minnesota ex reI Olson, 283 U;S. 697 (1931). The Supreme Court has defined a ''prior'' restraint as an order to ''prohibit the publication or broadcast of particular information commentary...." Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 556
(emphasis added). A requirement that cable operators set aside one channel for public access does not bar the dissemination of any particular information.
413. See Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413-14. See also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-56
(1980).
414. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
415. The interests included: maintaining proof that an individual had registered for

the draft, facilitating communication between registrants and the draft boards, reminding registrants to notify their draft boar<i of a change in address, and prohibiting
forgery. [d. at 379-80.
416. [d. at 382.
417. See text accompanying note 232, supra.
418. See text accompanying notes 228-229, supra.
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had a fair chance to influence local decision-making. 419
A requirement that a cable television operator set aside one
channel for public access is an "appropriately narrow" method
of .furthering those interests. The scope of such a rule is limited, establishing a forum for free speech without unnecessarily restricting the right or ability of cable operators to express
their views.420
There is a specific attribute of cable television which significantly decreases the extent of First Amendment protection for
the cable operator. Virtually every cable system offers programming produced by a source other than local broadcasters
or the system operator itself. Systems provide channels for
distant broadcast signals 421 and lease channels to pay entertainment or other programmers.422 Thus the "speech" on
those channels is not that of the cable operator but rather that
of a third party. In Buckley v. Valeo,423 the Supreme Court recognized the difference between a direct limitation on a person's speech and one on the right of a person to support the
speech of another. While striking down a limit on the amount
of money one could spend to express support for a candidate,424 the Court upheld a limitation on the amount a person
could contribute to a candidate's campaign.425 The difference
between the two limitations, according to the Court, was that
the contribution limitation
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication. . . . While contributions
may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an
association to present views to the voters, the transformation
of contributions into political debate involves speech by some419. See text accompanying notes 236-238, supra.
420. See text accompanying notes 272-276, supra.
421. The Federal Communication Commission's Rules limiting the number of distant stations a cable system could carry were deleted in 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 60186, 60299
(1980) (amending 47 C.F.R. §§.76.5. 76.7, 76.57, 76.59, 76.61, 76.63, 76.65, 76.151-161, 76.305).
The Commission's change in those rules was upheld in Malrite TV v. FCC, 7 Media L.
Rptr. 1649 (2d Cir. 1981).
422. As of June 1, 1981, 3954 out of approximately 4400 cable systems offered pay
channels. Spillman, Multiplay: A Case of Diminishing Returns?, CABLEVISION, June 1,
1981, at 137. Additionally, many systems offer satellite-fed channels as part of their
basic services. As of October 1, 1981, for example, 3633 systems offered WTBS (an
Atlanta broadcast station) and 2900 offered CBN (Christian Broadcast Network). See
Cable Stats, CABLE VISION, Nov. 23,1981, at 191.
423. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
424. Id. at 39-51.
425. Id. at 23-35.
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one other than the contrlbutor.426

In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,427 which upheld a
statute barring cigarette advertising from the "electronic media,"428 the district court held that a prohibition on a certain
type of advertising had "no substantial effect on the exercise of
broadcasters' First Amendment rights: "Even assuming that
loss of revenue from cigarette advertisements affects [broadcasters] with sufficient first amendment interest, [broadcasters], themselves, have lost no right to speak-they have only
lost an ability to collect revenue from others for broadcasting
their commercial messages."429
Similarly, a requirement that a cable operator reserve a
channel for public access rather than providing or leasing that
channel to a third party restricts marginally, if at all, the right
of free speech of the cable operator. The speech which is limited is not that of the cable operator but of the other programmer. Therefore, in those circumstances where an access
channel replaces a third-party-programmed channel, the "incidental restriction" on the First Amendment rights of the cable
television operator will be negligible.
If the cable operator were to decide not to lease any of the
available channels, but instead to use them for the operator's
own programming, there would be a substantial problem of
monopolization of a communications medium. Except for the
print media,430 the Supreme Court has rejected a First Amendment value in such total control. As the Court declared in Red
426. [d. at 20-21. See California Medical Assoc. v. FEC, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2712,
2722-23 (1981) (plurality opinion). Cj. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980). The Court

ruled that a law protecting servicemen's right to communicate with members of Congress did not apply to petitions, thus rejecting Justice Stewart's dissent that, "it seems
clear that a serviceman 'communicates' with his Congressman just as much when he
signs a letter drafted by a third person as when he writes and signs that letter himself." [d. at 375.
The Court struck down a local law limiting contributions to committees formed to
support or oppose ballot initiatives in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, - U.S. -,102 S. Ct. 434 (1981). The Court held the law unconstitutional because it
both restrained freedom of association and impermissibly limited freedom of expression because ''there is· no significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and
discussion of a ballot measure." [d. at 4073-74. Neither of these rationales are applicable to a cable access requirement.
427. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1971), summary a./f'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972).
428. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1980).
429. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 584.
430. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-258.
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Lion, "the First Amendment confers ... no right to an unconditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government
has denied others the right to use."431
While that decision dealt only with broadcast licensees, the
same concern for monopoly control of a scarce resource applies to cable television. The report of the Cabinet Committee
on Cable Television stated:
The private power of the cable system operator is potentially
great, because of the local monopoly characteristics of cable.
Unless restrained in some manner, the system operator could
control all of the channels on his system, which would constitute the bulk of the channels of electronic communications in a
particular locale. 432
Similarly, the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications
also warned of the danger that, left unregulated, a cable television operator could limit the diversity of available opinions and
viewpoints:
Questions of ownership and control of cable installations are
also relevant to questions of fairness. If the mass of individual
cable installations, throughout the country, were to be owned
or controlled by a few large corporate enterprises, as networks
are today controlled, the spectre of monopoly opinion would
arise in quite a different form. 433
While the Supreme Court has yet to uphold the constitutionality of a general right of access as a remedy for monopolization of a communications medium,434 the Court has indicated
its support for such a right of access under certain circumstances. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,435 the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of one
431. 395 U.S. at 391. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at
104:

One of the earliest and most frequently quoted statements of this dilemma is
that of Herbert Hoover, when he was Secretary of Commerce. While his Department was making exploratory attempts to deal with the infant broadcasting industry in the early 1920's, he testified before a House Committee: "We
cannot allow any single person or group to place themselves in [a) position
where they can censor the material which shall be broadcasted to the public,
nor do I believe that the Government should ever be placed in the position of
censoring this material." Hearings on H.R. 7357 before the House Committee on
the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1924).
See also Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 296 (1966).
432. Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 19-20.
433. Sloan Commission, supra note 50, at 94. See generally Posner, supra note 212,
at 106-09.
434. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2830.
435. 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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entity, a utility company, controlling access to an effective
means of communication, the billing envelope. While the
Court struck down a ban on the utility's mailing of inserts discussing issues of public policy, the Court pointed out that there
were other ways the billing envelope could have been regulated which would have been constitutional: "the Commission
has not shown on the record before us that the presence of the
bill inserts at issue would preclude the inclusion of other inserts that Consolidated Edison might be ordered lawfully to include in the billing envelope.,,436 Thus, the Court recognized
that the utility could have been required to include in its envelope inserts containing opposing views. 437
When the Court ruled that a television station's refusal to
sell time for any political advertising did not violate the First
Amendment,438 its decision pointed favorably at access rules
for cable television as potentially "both practicable and desirable. Indeed, the [Federal Communications] Commission
noted in these proceedings that the advent of cable television
will afford increased opportunities for the discussion of public
issues."439
Finally, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state may utilize
its inherent "police power or its sovereign right to adopt . . .
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by
436. Id. at 543 (emphasis added).
437. In fact, this was the remedy the Public Service Commission had originally
been requested to order. Id. at 532.
In Buckley, Chief Justice Burger dissented from the Court's ruling that public
financing of presidential elections was constitutional:
I would, however, fault the Court for not adequately analyzing and meeting
head on the issue whether public financial assistance to the private political
activity of individual citizens and parties is a legitimate expenditure of public
funds. The public monies at issue here are not being employed simply to po·
lice the integrity of the electoral process or to provide ajorumjor the use oj all

participants in the political dialogue, as would, jor example, be the case iffree
broadcast time were granted.
424 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added). See also BaTlZhaj, 405 F.2d at 1102. In upholding a
requirement that broadcast stations which carried cigarette advertising devote a sig·
nificant amount of time to advertisements in opposition to cigarette smoking, the court
stated:
INlot all free speakers have equally loud voices, and success in the market·
place of ideas may go the advocate who can shout the loudest or most often.
Debate is not primarily an end in itself, and a debate in which only one party
has the financial resources and interest to purchase sustained access to the
mass communications media is not a fair test of either an argument's truth or
its innate popular appeal.
438. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
439. Id. at 131.

No.1]

PUBLIC ACCESS REQUffiEMENTS

65

the Federal Constitution."440 In Pruneyard Shopping Center v.
Robins ,441 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a California constitutional provision giving all individuals the right of
free speech in privately owned shopping centers. The Court
stated:
Although appellants contend there are adequate alternative
avenues of communication available for appellees, it does not
violate the United States Constitution for the State Supreme
Court to conclude that access to appellants' property in the
manner required here is necessary to the promotion of stateprotected rights of free speech and petition.442
If a state imposes the requirement that a public access chan-

nel be established on its cable television systems, the state will
be making a decision on the importance of the access channel
in fulfilling First Amendment goals. Accordingly, it would not
violate the United States Constitution if a state concluded that
a cable television public access requirement "is necessary to
the promotion of state-protected rights of free speech and
petition. "443

IV
Conclusion
The question of whether public access requirements unconstitutionally infringe on the First Amendment rights of cable
television operators cannot be answered by simple analogy to
the constitutional rights of either newspaper owners or television broadcasters. A proper analysis cannot "mechanically apply the doctrines developed in other contexts . . .. The
unique situation presented ... calls ... for a careful inquiry
into the competing concerns of the State and the interests protected by the guarantee of free expression."444
Such an inquiry reveals that in the context of cable access
440. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 81.
441. Id. at 74.
442. Id. at 85 n.8. That a state statute, as well as a state constitutional provision, can
adopt more expansive state free speech protection than granted by the United States
Constitution was made manifest by the Court's discussion of Uoyd Corp. Ltd v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (which held that the federal Constitution did not prohibit the
owner of a shopping center from banning distribution of handbills on the property of
the shopping center). The Court stated in Pruneyard that in Lloyd, ''there was no
state constitutional or statutory provision that had been construed to create rights to
the use of private property by strangers ...." 444 U.S. at 81 (emphasis added).
443. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 85 n.8.
444. Young v. American Mini theaters, 427 U.S. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring).
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requirements, those concerns are not competing but are in fact
in accordance. There are both State and First Amendment interests in ensuring a diversity of speakers, protecting the individual's right to speak and to receive information, and
promoting peace within a community. Cable access rules further all of these goals.445 Access rules are unrelated to the content of the cable operator's speech, and permit the government
to remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.446 The net effect
of such a requirement would be an increase in the extent, variety, and vigor of public debate. 447
There are several different ways in which access rules can be
classified. Because they further substantial government interests which are not only unrelated to the suppression of speech
but which actually further freedom of expression, and leave
adequate alternate means for cable operators to communicate
their messages, the rules meet the constitutional requirement
of each classification.448
The Federal Communications Commission in promulgating
its rules said that an access channel could restore a sense of
community to a disparate population, increase public participation in the democratic process, and improve the scope and
quality of information shared by a locality.449 With the F.C.C.
barred from imposing its rule, it rests with each state to confer
these benefits upon its communities.

445.
446.
447.
448.
449.

See text accompanying notes 218-241, supra.
See text accompanying notes 255-261, supra.
See text accompanying notes 228-235, supra.
See text accompanying notes 277-445, supra.
See text accompanying note 112, supra.

